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The investigator has created and explained a process 
oriented conceptual model for curriculum theorizing as one 
alternative to technical, behavioral models currently in use 
exemplified by the work of theorists, such as Ralph Tyler. 
The investigator's model draws from the fields of anthro­
pology, communication theory, curriculum theory and general 
semantics as they exhibit a process orientation. The model 
has been created through the development of axiological, 
ontological and epistemological groundings which are process 
oriented. The model is bounded by the school setting and 
includes the following variables; process orientation, 
learners, teachers, human knowledge and human interactions 
within the school. Basic assumptions include first, to be 
interested in curriculum theory is to be primarily concerned 
about the lived-in experience of persons in school settings; 
second, to be interested in curriculum theory is to be 
concerned above all else about learners as unique and valued 
individuals; and third, all curriculum statements are value 
laden. The model has been evaluated in part through the use 
.of questionnaires given to the investigator's undergraduate 
students including one utilizing HcQuail's questions for 
analyzing a communication model. The questions are! Is the 
process one directional or interactional? Is the process 
open or closed? Are meanings fixed or transacted? Is the 
process seen from the perspective of the sender or receiver? 
Is the process purposive or non-purposive? Is the process 
system linked or system free? The model can be further 
tested through participant observation techniques as de­
veloped by Severyn Bruyn. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation will focus on creating and expli­
cating a model for curriculum theorizing which is process 
oriented, not to be presented as the one model for curricu­
lum theorizing, but rather as an alternative, idea generat­
ing model. Terms in the dissertation title, A Process Model 
For Curriculum Theorizing, are defined in the course of the 
first chapter. Each term in the title has been specifically 
and deliberately chosen by the writer. Methodology for this 
study is also found within Chapter One. Chapter Two has a 
review of the literature pertinent to concepts in the model, 
and the model itself is presented in Chapter Three. Evalua­
tion and implications of the model are presented in 
Chapter Four. 
Justification For The' Study 
The need for a study of this kind has been demonstrated 
by an emerging interest in modeling by those in curriculum 
theory. Information theory was an early source of modeling 
in curriculum theory as was systems theory (Ryans, 1956; 
Macdonald, 1966), The "Humanistic-Existential Personal 
iModel" of James Macdonald, Bernice Wolf son and Esther Zaret 
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was a recent, highly original contribution to the literature 
of the field (Macdonald, Wolfson & Zaret, 1974). Bruce 
Joyce and Marsha Weil have devoted a book to modeling in 
education wherein they describe some basic models in use now, 
call for the creation of new models, and discuss the sig­
nificance of modeling in education. "In the real world of 
education there are real decisions to be made among models 
which really differ from one another. By the models we 
choose, reality is created for our students " (Joyce & 
Weil, 1972, 19), Persons in many fields have written about 
the value of modeling for conceptualizing.* 
Macdonald has cited John Dewey's statement about the 
significance of educational philosophy as the core of all 
philosophy being, ''the study of how to have a world " 
(Macdonald, 1975b, 12) and Macdonald has elaborated, 
"Curriculum theory in this light might be said to be the 
essence of educational theory because it is the study of 
how to have a learning environment " (Macdonald, 1975b, 
12). Curriculum theorizing which draws on a variety of fields 
should prepare educators to create a richer, more liberating 
learning environment. This model takes insights from 
the fields of education, anthropology, communications theory 
and general semantics as they define and utilize a process 
orientation in their investigations. 
*See for example Bross, 1953, 161-182; Baudhuin, 1974, 415-
424; Whorf, 1956, 57-64; Meredith, 1970, 297-304. 
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The basic concerns inherent in this writer's work de­
rive from several assumptions which are the grounding for 
the model. The first assumption is that to be interested in 
curriculum theory is to be concerned about the lived-in 
world of persons in school settings, even if one is reluc­
tant to make pronouncements about what should be done in a 
given school next Tuesday at 9:45 A.M. The second assump­
tion is that to be interested in curriculum theory is to be 
concerned, above all, about persons as unique and valued 
individuals. Primary emphasis must be on persons, on stu­
dents and teachers, rather than on arbitrarily pre­
determined outcomes or curricular materials. The third 
assumption is that all curriculum statements are value-
laden because the curriculum theorist is a world shaper. 
Curriculum theorizing is a serious business to be playfully, 
artfully approached by persons who create holistically. 
Rather than taking place in a vacuum, curriculum theoriz­
ing, design and implementation are strongly influenced by 
cultural factors. Therefore, the common practice of calling 
such work value free, neutral, and objective is an unfortu­
nate one because it tends to lock educators into the status 
quo, avoiding critical examination of that status quo. 
Macdonald's re-occuring question, "In whose interest?" 
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is a necessary corrective for it helps in locating the 
source of values operating in the school setting.* 
The tendency in curriculum theory and design has been 
to consciously or unconsciously adopt a deterministic way 
of considering and manipulating students and teachers. 
Much has been borrowed from behavioral psychology and ef­
ficiency studies in industry with learning considered in 
terms of products rather than processes. For example, 
B. F. Skinner saw little need to observe the rats in his 
boxes but focused instead on the rats' final behavior--
the pressing of the lever. Much the same kind of thinking 
prevails in our public schools where the implicit mode of 
operation is to cover material. Learning, therefore, is 
often thought of as a product, discrete and fixed, after 
certain specified objectives have been attained. Taken for 
granted is the notion that goals and objectives can be 
determined before learning activities are experienced. 
However, now some theorists in education and in other fields 
are suggesting that purposes and objectives can never be 
clear cut and known in a worthwhile sense before the learn­
ing activities are experienced.** Emphasis on a process 
*This question is an important, largely neglected one. Some 
theorists take for granted limitations on curriculum which 
should not be found in a democratic society. "Some knowledge 
and skills, though teachable and very much a part of the 
culture, are not available for curriculum, since they are 
kept secret by families, craft groups, corporations, or 
governments." (Johnson, 1967, 132) 
**See for example Huebnor, 1975a, b and March,1977. 
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orientation in this dissertation will be an alternative way 
of examining school settings and expectations about learning. 
Definition of Terms 
As stated earlier, the terms in the title of this dis­
sertation have been deliberately chosen as the writer has 
worked through her model construction. The terms will be 
defined in this order: curriculum theorizing as process 
and curriculum theorizing as model building. Borrowing 
from Israel Scheffler's definitional framework, the defini­
tions in this dissertation are intended to be stipulative 
and programmatic. "The interest of stipulative definitions 
is communicatory . . . offered in the hope of facilitating 
discourse. . . . The interest of programmatic definitions 
is moral, that is, they are intended to embody programs 
of action " (Scheffler, 1960, 22) » 
Curriculum Theorizing as Process 
A process orientation regarding curriculum theory en­
visions occurences and relationships as dynamic, ever 
evolving, infinitely complex and multi-dimensional. The 
number of variables is virtually infinite and all are inter­
related, mutually affected. Therefore the richness of every­
thing which is happening is impossible to fully comprehend 
or capture. A process orientation is disharmonious with a 
concept of clear cut beginnings and endings and with static, 
set goals and objectives. "Things" do not exist; processes 
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evolve. The English language has not been helpful in this 
t 
regard, for it tends to influence the users thinking toward 
solid rather than process orientations. This language bias 
will be examined more fully in Chapter Three as a backdrop 
for the model. 
The meaning of the term process in this dissertation 
derives from a grounding in process philosophy. It differs 
therefore substantially from J. Cecil Parker and Louis 
Rubin's concept of "process as content " (Parker & Rubin, 
1966). They have defined process as 
All the random, or ordered, operations which can 
be associated with knowledge and with human ac­
tivities. There are a variety of processes 
through which knowledge is created. There are 
also processes for utilizing knowledge and for 
communicating it. Processes are involved in 
arriving at decisions, in evaluating consequences, 
and in accomodating new insights. (Parker & Rubin, 
1966, 2) 
Their models are designed in terms of "methods of thinking" 
and in terms of specific "intellectual procedures" (Rubin & 
Parker, 1966, 22) the student uses to learn a particular 
discipline. Some of the processes given in their three 
models are "formulating questions, analyzing the material, 
creating operational devices, summarizing, classifying and 
performing " (Rubin & Parker, 1966, 55-63). Rubin and 
Parker's emphasis on "the utilization of the evidence 
gathered from a penetrating study of people doing things, as 
they go about the business of life, in reordering the cur­
riculum " (Rubin & Parker, 1966, 48) is noteworthy. 
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In this century scientific investigators have moved 
from a Newtonian things and events orientation to an 
Einsteinian world-in-process orientation. However, those 
of us in education seem determined to cling to our 17th 
century conceptions of reality. Much that passes for 
learning in the schools is a mechanical and lifeless memori­
zation of "facts" which have no real meaning for the student. 
The student and the curriculum are seen as two concrete, 
very distinct entities. It is fruitful to look at the 
thought of philosophers such as Whitehead on process orien­
tations, making analogies to education. Whitehead has said; 
The how an actual entity becomes constitutes what 
the actual entity i_s so that the two descriptions 
of an actual entity are not independent. Its 
"being" is constituted by its "becoming." This 
is the principle of process. Process is the be­
coming of experiences. (Smith, 1970, 175) 
This writer adapts the above statement for curriculum 
theorizing in general and for this dissertation specifically 
to read as follows: 
The curriculum whereby a student becomes educated 
constitutes what that student is; so there is no 
clear cut distinction between the student and 
what he or she is experiencing in the school 
setting. The student's "being" is constituted 
by his or her "becoming." This is a principle 
of curriculum theorizing as process. Curricu­
lum is the becoming of school experiences. 
Virgil Herrick supports a common view of education by 
stating that every learning situation must include a 
learner, a purpose, a content and process (Herrick, 1950, 
38). In this dissertation the investigator shall examine 
whether those concepts are as separate and legitimate as he 
and others present them. This inquirer believes it would b 
more rewarding to speculate about the school experience in 
terms of evolving curriculum rather than what tends to be­
come static content passively absorbed. Furthermore, the 
writer asserts it is not. integrative to talk in terms of 
learners in isolation from a holistic view of them as en­
tire persons. Dewey has spoken to this by enjoining us: 
"Abandon the notion of subject matter as something fixed 
and ready made in itself, outside the child's experience; 
cease thinking of the child's experience as also something 
hard and fast; see it as something fluent, embryonic, 
vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are 
simply two limits which define a single process " 
(Archambault, 1964, 345). McLuhan's "The medium is the 
message," could be extended to say, "The process is the 
content." McQuail's questions for looking at communication 
process questions serve as guidelines for our examination 
of a process model for curriculum theorizing! 
1. Is the process one directional or interactional? 
2. Is the process open or closed? 
3. Are meanings fixed or "transacted"? 
4. Is the process seen from the perspective of the 
sender or receiver? 
5. Is the process purposive or non-purposive? 
6. Is the process system linked or system free? 
(McQuail, 1975, 28-30) 
These questions will be considered later in evaluating the 
model in this dissertation. 
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Curriculum Theorizing as Model Building 
This section will briefly discuss modeling in general 
and modeling in this dissertation. A model is a symbolic 
device for abstracting and categorizing important aspects 
of the process under investigation. A model has organiza­
tional, heuristic and predictive functions. Social justi­
fication is required for the model's existence and it must 
be able to stand up to evaluation. Model development can 
be verbal, graphic and iconic. There is no such thing as 
the one model true for all time and for all contingencies. 
Modeling helps persons to organize their perceptions. Marc 
Belth has discussed the inevitability of human modeling: 
We use models before we even know we have them. 
Within some model the events we see are symbolized. 
. . . Without some model the world of things 
would, undoubtedly, exist and would be sensed in 
some way, but it would have no meaning. . . . For 
it is some model that gives to the world qualities 
it does not otherwise have, certainly that could 
never be discerned. Nor is this a dissolution 
into total subjectivity, because the models 
themselves are public in form, and are themselves 
examinable. . . . The only time that models of 
some kind are not in use are those occasions 
when no thinking occurs. (Belth, 1977, 59-60) 
Belth makes distinctions among analogies, models and meta­
phors useful for the model builder: 
By means of a model we examine, in its totality, 
an event that is otherwise not examinable. By 
means of analogy we cross sorts of things with 
one another within the model, so that unfamiliar 
elements are treated in terms of the more 
familiar or the more readily accessible. And 
by means of a metaphor we transfer the specific 
traits of one event to another so that the 
analogical relationship can be made clear and 
apparent. (Belth, 1977, 7-8) 
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He makes a further distinction between hard and soft models 
which is also valuable. He says that models in which actual 
objects are being symbolized are hard or scientific models 
and that those in which symbols depict conceptual matters 
are soft models (Belth, 1977, 66). He observes that models 
can be placed on a continuum regarding hardness and softness. 
He notes, as have others,* that the scientist begins with 
analogies and models all the time in experimentation and 
that newer more inclusive models must continually challenge 
others through their power to provide explanations (Belth, 
1977, 195-196), It is erroneous to think a scientific model 
is necessarily more valuable or true than a conceptual one. 
Influence on the lives of people remains a major consideration 
in judging the significance of a given model (Belth, 1977, 
68). One should keep that thought in mind while turning 
toward consideration of modeling in curriculum theorizing. 
The model in this dissertation will not be an ameliora­
tive one. The kind of curriculum theorizing which says we 
must do something, anything and fast, because the schools 
are in such a sorry state, will be avoided for this leads 
to piecemeal attempts at repair jobs instead of overall 
careful reconceptualization. Herbert Kliebard discusses the 
"production model" which has been dominant- in curriculum 
theory and design and suggests, "The task of the future is 
*See for example Kuhn, 1962. 
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to develop alternative modes of thinking to the dominant 
production model of the last fifty years " (Kliebard, 1975, 
48-49), Mauritz Johnson has spoken to this also. He has 
stated that theorizers have been more concerned with im­
provement than with insight and with platforms which propose 
policies rather than with theories which provide explana­
tions (Johnson, 1967, 127-8), The model in this disserta­
tion will be philosophic and interpretive. Moreover, it 
will be a model which persons can use to theorize broadly 
and to question current assumptions about school settings 
and the individuals in them. Further, the model will be in­
fluenced by the conception of Ian Ramsey and of John Mann on 
the necessity for positing a disclosure model as opposed to 
a picture model. The latter is evaluated in terms of its 
"static accuracy," the former by "its capacity to continue 
generating new propositions that reveal the phenomenon. . . 
Where the picturing model closes the world, the disclosure 
model discloses, opens the world " (Mann, 1975b, 143-144). 
The source of the disclosure model is grounded in the model 
creator's personal knowledge of ethical reality and its 
findings "are not the result of operations upon data, but 
are rather the result of extensions, transformations, and 
deployments of intuitively held personal knowledge " 
(Mann, 1975b, 144), Moreover, a model which fails to dis­
close meanings and provide explanations has little value; 
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while disclosure modeling can be very individual, it is not 
private. 
James March enjoins the model creator to consider the 
justice of her model, acknowledging that justice is never 
fully attained but must be pursued. "In that pursuit we ac­
cept responsibility for social myths by which we live. . . . 
Models are not neutral .... Independent of its truth 
value, a model has a justice value " (March, 1977, 2). 
Barbour notes that models aid in the evoking of attitudes, 
the guidance of behavior, the interpretation of experience 
and the organization of perception (Barbour, 1974, 16), 
This writer acknowledges the importance of each of those 
functions in her model creation and in her anticipation of 
its applications. Barbour also makes a distinction between 
myths and models, saying the models come from "reflection on 
the living myths which communities transmit " (Barbour, 
1974, 27), Of crucial importance to this writer in that 
statement is the emphasis on the word "livingModels are 
always with us but their liveliness must be scrutinized so 
that the most vital models can be guides to human actions. 
Barbour enjoins the model creator to take her model seriously 
but not literally (Barbour, 1974, 38). This too must be done. 
The investigator has worked in this study to create a just 
model, a conceptual model from which meanings about the lives 
of learners and teachers in the school experience can be ex­
plored. The model is verbal rather than graphic or iconic. 
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The model creator asserts that in the creation of the model 
and in her attempt to give life to the model in her own 
teaching she does accept responsibility for the social myths 
by which she lives and interacts with students. 
Methodology 
Successful model creation demands that the designer 
specify a value orientation from which the work has evolved, 
determine the boundaries of the model and the variables to 
be included in the model showing their relationships. The 
model must be subject to evaluation and must have usefulness 
to persons other than the creator. Macdonald's thoughts on 
the purposes of curriculum theorizing serve as a guide for 
methodology, "to develop and criticize conceptual schema 
in the hope that new ways of talking about curriculum, 
which may in the future be far more fruitful than present 
orientations, will be forthcoming " (Macdonald, 1975b, 6), 
In this dissertation a method of investigation into 
curriculum theorizing will be used which considers curricu­
lum theorizing as deliberate activity, as activity based on 
human interests and concerns, as inherently subjective and 
as intellectually playful. The writer asserts that curricu­
lum theorizing must be seen as deliberate effort to create 
integrative knowledge. The writer assumes that persons who 
cannot discuss the models through which they operate in 
education have probably failed to carefully think through 
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what they are attempting to do and why. Since the writer 
believes that those in education, above all others must be 
concerned with human development and enhancement, she posits 
that curriculum theorizing must have as its basic grounding 
emphasis on the lived experience of the student, seen 
holistically. Ralph Tyler's interest in the needs of the 
learner as a source of objectives is faulty for such inter­
est basically identifies the needs so that they can be 
manipulated through instruction pre-determined by the 
teacher (Kliebard, 1975, 70-83). 
In this dissertation the model creator seeks to explore 
for herself and others a deductive model in which the es­
sential variables emerge from her existential, process 
philosophic grounding. The essential variables are process 
orientation, learners, teachers, human knowledge and human 
interactions within the school. The model is bounded by 
the school setting. However it is not confined to any grade 
or age levels of schooling. Political factors operating in 
the world beyond the school are acknowledged but are not an 
integral part of the model since the designer has been con­
cerned primarily with the lived-in school experience of the 
student. Alvin Gouldner has spoken to the question of 
where problems for study come from! 
Much of any man's effort to know the social world 
around him is prompted by an effort, more or less 
disguised or deliberate to know things that are 
personally important to him .... Like it or 
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not, and know it or not, in confronting the 
social world the theorist is also confronting 
himself. (Gouldner, 1970, 41) 
Belth explains J 
The events of the world do not come to us self-
labeled. We give them labels, names, identities. 
We note and define problems. . . . Nature, as 
nature, in this conception has no problems. 
(Belth, 1977, 14) 
Humans do have problemSj however, and seek to explore them. 
This writer, concerned with the lived-in experience of per­
sons in school takes the school setting as the place to 
give her concepts a "local habitation," in Belth's terms 
(Belth, 1977, 40), Her methodology emerges from the assump­
tion that all human knowledge is derived from human con­
cerns and from human perceptions and that reality therefore 
is constructed by humans attempting to explain the world to 
themselves and to make a better world for themselves. 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman's concept of "reificat ion" 
is usefu] to the person designing a model which questions the 
usual lived-in world of the student and teacher! 
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena 
as if they were things, that is, non-human or pos­
sibly suprahuman terms. Another way of saying this 
is that : reification is the apprehension of the 
products of human activity as i_f they were some­
thing else than human products—such as facts of 
nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations 
of divine will. Reification implies that man is 
capable of forgetting his own authorship of the . 
human world, and further, that the dialectic be­
tween man, the producer, and his products is lost 
to consciousness. The reified world, is by 
definition, a dehumanized world. ... As soon as 
an objective social world is established, the 
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possibility of reification is never far away. The 
objectivity of the social world means that it con­
fronts man as something outside of himself. The 
decisive question is whether he still retains the 
awareness that, however objectivated, the social 
world was made by men—and, therefore, can be re­
made by them. In other words, reification can be 
described as an extreme step in the process of 
objectif ication , whereby the objectivated world 
loses its comprehensibi1ity as a human enterprise 
and becomes fixated as a non-human, non-humanizable 
inert facticity. Typically, the real relationship 
between man and his world is reversed in conscious­
ness. Man, the producer of a world, is apprehended 
as its product, and human activity as an 
epiphenomenon of non-human processes. Human be­
ings are no longer understood as world-producing 
but as being, in their turn, products of "the 
nature of things." It must be emphasized that 
reification is a modality of consciousness, more 
precisely, a modality of man's objectification of 
the human world. Even while apprehending the 
world in reified terms, man continues to produce 
it. That is, man is capable paradoxically of pro­
ducing a reality that denies him. (Berger & 
Luckman, 1966, 83-84) 
This will not be an experimental dissertation verified 
empirically. It will not be an "objective" study. One can 
turn to realizations of the 20th century scientist for in­
put concerning objective and subjective ways of knowing. 
Louis De Broglie has said; 
When we set out to observe facts we soon find our­
selves dealing with a Reality which is always in­
finitely complex and full of an infinity of 
shades, and on the other with our understanding, 
which forms concepts which are always more or less 
rigid and abstract. . . . Reality is too fluid and 
too rich to be contained in its entireity within 
the strict and abstract framework of our 
scientific ideas.. (Matson, 1964, 154) 
Weizsacker has pondered what it is that the researcher 
actually studies" 
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We wanted to press on behind appearances to the 
things themselves in order to know them and to 
possess them; now it appears that precisely beyond 
our natural perceptual world the very concept of 
thing can be defined only in relation to the man 
to whom it appears or who himself makes it. . . . 
Contemporary physics compels the physicist to 
look upon himself as subject. . . . From the very 
start we are involved in the argument between 
nature and man in which science plays only a part, 
so that the common division of the world into 
subject and object, inner and outer world, body 
and soul, is no longer adequate and leads us 
into difficulties. (Matson, 1964, 144) 
The ethnomethodologist explains,"Social theorists assume there 
is a meaningful external world independent of social inter­
action. . . . Ethnomethodology investigates the interactional 
work that sustains this assumption " (Mehan and Wood, 1975, 
5), This researcher is also concerned with interactions as 
she examines the "givens" that have dominated curriculum 
theorizing partly as a consequence of domain assumptions 
and of language. She is designing an alternative model 
drawn from her philosophic grounding. Her modeling approach 
is conscious, deliberate, artful and playful. Mann is help­
ful in his discussion of curriculum creation as art form'. 
Technological talk cannot comprehend a curriculum 
as art. For technological talk is precisely talk 
about conditions, conditioning and the conditioned. 
It is talk locked into a means end, cause-effect 
structure which cannot be bent to describe cur­
riculum as unconditioned immediacy .... To re­
gard an object of art, or a curriculum-as-art as 
unconditioned is not to forget that it is con­
ditioned, but merely to look at it and talk about 
it in its artfulness. And surely a curriculum, 
which cannot be art, can be artful to some degree, 
and can be considered not only in terms of how it 
conditions and is conditioned by man, but also in 
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terms of how it answers man's listening and 
seeking. (Mann, 1975b, 136) 
Alphonse Chapanis is helpful in his discussion of modeling 
as intellectual play, "a grown-up sophisticated version of 
a child's game, but a game nonetheless "* (Chapanis, 1961, 
118), Edward Krug notes that professors do not value playful­
ness ! 
To foster intellect as play will not require the 
neglect of intelligence for practical ends. . . 
the world of teacher education is loaded against 
it. Preoccupied with the turning out of teachers 
competent in the technology of their craft, 
educationists find little opportunity and show 
little inclination to apply the idea of their own 
work and to regard "education" as a study to be 
pursued, in part at least for its values as 
intellectual play. (Krug, 1966, 403-404) 
Methodological assumptions which could have application 
for the curriculum theorizer are taken from David Smith in 
a process approach to communication theory.' 
First, the quality of a finding does not rest in 
important measure on the objectivity of the pro­
cedures used. Indeed objectivity becomes an empty 
concept. Stated positively information would be 
accepted on the basis of its richness of explana­
tion. Second, the nature and limitations of the 
observer's perspective must always be stipulated 
along with his observations. . . . Third, a num­
ber of differing explanations can be accepted 
simultaneously insofar as they derive from dif­
fering perspectives. It is not necessary to 
attempt studies which will provide a final choice 
between competing theories. Fourth, inasmuch as 
the phenomena change, differing explanations from 
the same perspective may be held simultaneously 
when situations or contexts differ. Fifth, more 
complete explanations will be developed through 
attempting to employ more holistic perspectives 
*See also Macdonald, Wolfson & Zaret, 1974, Appendix B; and 
Brubaker, 1976, 65-66. 
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rather than by accumulating the results of indi­
vidual analytic studies. (Smith, 1972, 179) 
Mann provides a caution as work on the dissertation begins! 
A good conception should not be sacrificed or re­
duced in importance for lack of immediately avail­
able operational definition of variables. But the 
language used should be as precise as possible and 
as close to operationality as possible without such 
sacrifice. Speculation should not be an excuse 
for sloppiness, but the need ultimately to measure 
should not be an excuse for avoiding explanation 
of some of the more complex components of educa­
tional experience. (Mann, 1975a, 161) 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter will summarize a review of the literature 
pertinent to the dissertation with special attention given 
to the 1iterature helpful in creation of the model. The 
first part of the chapter entitledPerspectiveswill indi­
cate the kind of background reading and questions the in­
vestigator has pursued in order to become competent in the 
literature of curriculum theory. The rest of the chapter 
will be organized around sources used in establishing the 
philosophic bases of the model. The following headings 
used in Chapter III will serve as the other organizing 
headings of this chapter: Domain Assumptions, Language, 
Axiological Orientation, Ontological Orientation, 
Epistemological Orientation and Interaction in the Model. 
Perspectives 
Curriculum theorizing is a relatively new field in the 
area of curriculum. William Pinar has made a distinction 
among three kinds of curriculum theorists. The largest group, 
60 to 80 percent, are traditionalists and their work is.' 
characterized by the pragmatic, by the concrete 
ever-changing tasks of curriculum development, 
design, implementation, and evaluation. The 
bulk of this writing has one essential purpose; 
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it is intended as guidance for those who work 
in the schools. (Pinar, 1975, xi) 
A second and smaller group, 15 to 20 percent, are conceptual 
empiricists who investigate "'phenomena1 empirically with 
an eye to the goal of prediction and control of behavior " 
(Pinar, 1975, xii ). The third and smallest group, 3 to 5 
percent, are reconceptualists. The reconceptualists' 
emphases; 
have not been observable and measurable behavior--
as they tend to be for the conceptual empiricists— 
or the tasks of the practitioner--as they tend to 
be for the traditionalist. Rather, the recon­
ceptualists tend to concern themselves with the 
internal and existential experience of the public 
world. ... In brief, the reconceptualist 
attempts to understand the nature of the educational 
experience. (Pinar, 1975, xii-xiii) 
The investigator has read widely in the classics of 
curriculum literature, with a classic defined as "a work that 
had a specific impact on the thinking of its time, or 
functioned as a turning point document in curriculum theory 
development, or endured as a widely used referent piece " 
(Fralev, 1976, 1), The investigator's reading therefore has 
taken her back to the writings of William T. Harris (1897 
and 1898); Frederick Taylor (1911); and Franklin Bobbitt 
(1912, 1918). Their work represents the beginnings of cur­
riculum study in this country with a strong focus on bor­
rowing terminology and ways of thinking from the world of 
industry and applying these to education. The reading has 
logically continued through progressive educators such as 
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Dewey (1915, 1933, 1938, 1944, 1965, Archambault, 1964); 
Counts (1932); and many others. All of the classics in 
curriculum theory cited by Fraley (1976) were among the works 
read. They are included in the bibliography at the end of 
this dissertation. The investigator has read books cur­
rently in use as curriculum texts such as Goodlad, von 
Stoephasius, and Klein (1966); and Saylor and Alexander 
(1974). She has read widely in the works of the reconceptu-
alists whose literature is growing. This reading has in­
cluded but not been limited to Pinar (1974, 1975) as an ex­
cellent starting point introducing one to the writings of 
Huebner, Mann, Macdonald, Kliebard, Apple and Shaw, among 
others. Wolfson (1966, 1968, 1977) and Molnar and Zahorik 
(1977) have also been among the most useful authors read. 
The investigator conducted an ERIC search, consulted 
dissertation abstracts and read widely in journals such as 
Educational Leadership, The Journal of Teacher Education 
and Educational Theory. 
William A. Jenkins has observed in reaction to a Huebner 
paper that "a task of no small size must be assumed by the 
curriculum leader. . . . The task does more than provide a 
challenge; it can overwhelm, engulf, enervate, and stupify " 
(Jenkins, 1966, 22). Jenkins questions whether the cur­
riculum theorizer can have substantial knowledge in the 
fields of politics, economics, sociology, art, the humani­
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ties, communications, group dynamics, history and anthro­
pology. It is evident to this investigator that the recon-
ceptualist curriculum theorists have expertise in varying 
fields, excluding no areas of human knowledge from their do­
main, welcoming into their small number persons from varied 
professional backgrounds. A glance at the personal biographi­
cal sketches in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists 
quickly shows that the contributors to the volume came to 
their interest in curriculum theory from original profes­
sional interests as varied as theology, as music, as mathe­
matics, as engineering, as philosophy, etc. (Pinar, 1975) 
So perhaps while one curriculum theorist cannot be a scholar 
of the humanities, the fine and applied arts, the physical 
and social sciences, etc., in the aggregate curriculum theor­
ists can synergistically combine rich interests and diverse 
experiences to truly reconceptualize curriculum theorizing. 
This investigator's explorations into reconceptualiza-
tion through model creation have led her to read widely in 
the fields of American curriculum classics, communication 
theory, general semantics, and anthropology. The reader is 
asked to consult the bibliography at the end of the disser­
tation as an essential but necessarily partial guide to what 
the investigator has carefully read as background preparation 
for her model creation task. The investigator's reading pat­
tern developed through interest in these questions which 
eventually came to be focused on model creation as the task 
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of the dissertation: Are most of us aware that persons with­
in the same society and among societies perceive their worlds 
very differently? In whose interest is it for some to try 
to convince others (blacks or women, for example) that the 
reality of those in power in the status quo is everyone's 
reality? How have language influences and unexamined as­
sumptions about reality tended to lock the larger society 
and the schools into a status quo? If curriculum can be 
thought of in terms of "influence over persons" (Mann, 1975b, 
145) and curriculum theorizing can be thought of in terms of 
"how to have a world," (Macdonald, 1975b, 12) how does the 
lived-in experience of learners and teachers reflect the 
larger American reality beyond the schools? In whose inter­
est is it to say that current modus operandi in the schools 
and in curriculum are merely "givens" of American life? In 
whose interest is it to assume that American curriculum is 
neutral or value free? Should those who write materials for 
students to use and those who spend their days in the class­
room with students specify the value orientations under which 
they are operating? What of the administrators and the need 
to examine their attitudes towards teachers and students? 
If one wants to speculate about the kinds of questions asked 
above, how does one do it? What is modeling? How can 
modeling aid in thinking about the lived-in experience of 
students and teachers? What kinds of models are there? How 
does one create a model? How does one evaluate a model? 
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Domain Assumptions 
The investigator's concentration on the lived-in ex­
perience of persons in school led her to speculate about 
why usual ways of operating in the schools and usual con­
cepts about the nature of persons in the schools seem to be 
"givens," essentially taken for granted as "the way things 
are." Earlier her interest in feminism had led her to 
reading radical feminists and black revolutionary rhetoric. 
This first deeply implanted in her mind the notion that 
people create their social worlds and the worlds are created 
to some persons' advantage and to others' disadvantage. 
She read biographies of Malcolm X and his own works noting 
that persons typically wrote of him, "He was dealing, as 
he recognized himself, in symbolic action; he was attempt­
ing the liberation of black men by altering the terms in 
which they thought and the scale by which they measured 
themselves " (Goldman, 1973). And of black-white relations 
black persons were writing statements like this! 
It is necessary for us to develop a new frame of , 
reference which transcends the limits of white 
concepts. ... By and large, reality has been 
conceptualized in terms of the narrow point of 
view of the small minority of white men who live 
in Europe and North America. . . . We must say to 
the white world that there are things in the 
world that are not dreamt of in your history and 
your sociology and your philosophy. (Bennett, 
1973, frontpiece) 
This kind of reading led the investigator to ask these sorts 
of questions. How are the public and private worlds in 
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which humans live constructed? Who decides how persons in 
certain roles or of certain races, or of certain sex or 
certain age ranges should behave? Who decides on "the 
rules of the game" by which a given society operates and 
to whose advantage are the rules formulated? How much of 
what happens in schools between persons happens because 
persons have not thought of other possibilities? What have 
been the "givens" of schooling in America during this 
century? How can these "givens" be examined for possible 
reformulation? The investigator found Gouldner's The 
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970) especially valu­
able as she began her reading and adopted his term, domain 
assumptions. Also useful were Berger and Luckman's The 
Social Construction of Reality (1966) and the work of the 
ethnomethologists Garfinkel (1967) and Mehan and Wood. 
(1975) The reconceptualists cited earlier in this review 
were helpful typified by sources such as Apple's 
"Commonsense Categories and Curriculum Thought (1975a)» 
Curriculum classics previously cited were also valuable as 
were readings from anthropology such as Levi-Strauss's 
The Savage Mind (1966) and Burling's Man's Many Voices 
(1970) to list only two books. General semantics sources 
such as the writings of Korzybski (1948) and Hayakawa 
(1962, 1972) served as essential background reading as did 
Symbolic Interaction Theory in Communication Theory for 
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example Blumer's "Symbolic Interaction: An Approach to 
Human Communication " (1972), 
Language 
Speculation about taken for granted realities of the 
school experience led the investigator to questions about 
the frequently unseen influence of language in human af­
fairs, particularly in educational settings. She recalled 
Franz Fanon musing about school children in the Antilles 
reading in their books about "our ancestors, the Gauls " 
(Fanon, 1967, 146) as well as feminist Mary Daley's dis­
cussion of "the power of naming " ; 
We have not been free to use our power to name 
ourselves, the world or God. The old naming 
was not the product of dialogue--a fact inad­
vertently admitted in the Genesis story of 
Adam's naming the animals and the woman. 
Women are now realizing that the universal imposing 
of names by men has been false because partial. 
That is, inadequate words have been taken as 
adequate. ... To exist humanly is to name 
the self, the world, and God. . . . The libera­
tion of language is rooted in the liberation of 
ourselves. (Daly, 1973, 9) 
The investigator began to think of questions such as these! 
What is unique about human language? How does our language 
influence the way we think and the way we act toward each 
other? How can persons remind themselves that the word and 
the referent are different? Are words neutral? Do words 
mean or do people mean? Do words on paper speak of reality 
in a different manner from the way spoken words do? Do 
people speaking different languages perceive reality 
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differently and label that reality differently? What of 
language used in the schooling experience? Does it need 
critical examination? To pursue these questions, the in­
vestigator did extensive reading in the fields of general 
semantics and anthropology. She drew from the work of 
Korzybski (1948), Bois (1957, 1975), Lee (1941), Hayakawa 
(1962, 1972), Whorf (1956) and Postman and Weingartner 
(1969) among many others and she surveyed all of the issues 
of Etc., the general semantics journal, published within 
the last ten years. From the field of anthropology she 
found Hall (1959, 1976); Goody and Watt (1972); Lee (1959); 
Levi-Strauss (1966); Burling (1970); and Tyler (1969) 
especially thought provoking. The reconceptionalists were 
drawn on extensively, particularly Huebner in articles such 
as "Curric.ular Language and Classroom Meanings" (1975a) 
and Apple in selections including "Commonsense Categories 
and Curriculum Thought" (1975a). 
Axiological Orientation 
To consider the question of the value base of her model, 
the investigator had to consider first whether all cur­
riculum theorizing necessarily originates from an explicit 
or implicit axiological grounding and if so, what the 
axiological grounding of her model would be. She worked 
through these kinds of questions! Can the curriculum 
theorist's work be value free? Which is more authentic, to 
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seek future good for students, future-based rationale for 
what is being experienced now in the school setting or to 
value above all the present experience for itself? If one 
especially values the present, one must also speculate about 
how far the present extends and in what directions. Is there 
a past or a future independent of the present? Are events 
in time more connected or more discrete? Should educators 
prepare students to live their lives in anticipation of 
permanence or in anticipation of change? Do persons them­
selves change more over the course of their lifetimes or 
maintain more stability over the course of their [lifetimes? 
What is the essential, crucial purpose of education? 
Questions such as these led the investigator to the recon-
ceptualists cited above, especi al ] y to Macdonald (1975a, 
1977) and also to Phenix's powerful "Transcendence and the 
Curriculum" (1975) and Huebner's "Curriculum as Concern for 
Man's Temporality" (1975b). Pepper's World Hypotheses 
(1970) was helpful in focusing the reading as were works 
such as Dunkel's Whitehead on Education (1965); Kaufmann's 
Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (1975); Mead's 
"The Present as the Locus of Reality" (3965); Whitehead's 
The Aims of Education (1967); Whorfs' Language^ Thought tand 
Reali ty (1956) and a provocative classic, Thomas Hopkins' 
Interaction: The Democratic Process (1941). 
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Ontological Orientation 
To sharply focus on persons in her model, the investi­
gator had to define carefully for herself her conception of 
being. She pondered these questions: Is it more fruitful 
to speculate about persons in terms of being or in terms of 
becoming? Are persons more like verbs or more like nouns? 
Is it fruitful to try to determine in advance of an educa­
tional experience what a given student will "get out" of 
the experience? Should the terms teacher and learner be 
scrutinized regarding their connoted meanings, their pos­
sible oversimplifications? Are teachers frequently learners? 
Are learners frequently teachers? Does most learning take 
place in a school setting? Are persons best considered as 
separate from what they do or are they best defined by what 
they are doing? Questions of this type led the investigator 
through writings of Dewey, Whitehead, and many reconceptual-
ists as cited earlier in this literature review. Philoso-
phers of Process (Browning, 1965)^ including excerpts from 
the writings of Henri Bergson, Charles Sanders Peirce, 
William James, Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, John Dewey, 
George Herbert Mead and Alfred North Whitehead,was valuable. 
Also useful were Pragmatism in Education (Bayles, 1966) and 
Readings in Twentieth Century Philosophy (Alston & 
Nakhnikian, 1963)# Especially valuable sources from anthro­
pology included the works of Lee (1959) and Hall (1959, 
1976) and from general semantics the writings of Korzybski 
(1948) and Marsh (1969). 
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Epistemological Orientation 
The investigator was interested in the following kinds 
of questions as she began to speculate about the nature of 
human knowledge in the model creation task! What essential 
interests are reflected in search for human knowledge? Is 
human knowledge more like a commodity or a process? Is 
human knowledge more changing or unchanging in its nature? 
Is the acquisition of human knowledge a deliberate endeavor 
most of the time or not? Can human knowledge be best con­
sidered as segmented, separated into specific disciplines 
or not? Is it most helpful to consider the learner's intel­
lect in human knowledge acquisition as of paramount impor­
tance or must his intellectual, physical and emotional 
capacities be all considered together, all the time? Are 
there some essential things which everyone must know? Does 
the meaning of the knowledge reside in the knowledge itself 
or in the knower? Can a person know more than he can tell? 
Does knowing the name mean that the person really knows 
significantly about that which has been named? Does a given 
language pre-dispose a person toward certain ways of think­
ing about human knowledge? To provide the conceptual 
framework for the part of her model concerned with knowledge, 
the investigator read widely in general works as well as in 
education sources. Among the general works read were 
The Conditions of Knowledge (Scheffler, 1965); What is 
Knowledge? (Pears, 1971); and Genetic Epistemology (Piaget, 
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1970); and The Process of Thinking (Belth, 1977). Books 
concerned with the idiosyncrasy of human knowledge were read 
including words from the fields of the physical and social 
sciences such as The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Kuhn, 1962); The Broken Image (Matson, 1964); The Social 
Construction of Reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966); 
Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenological Approach 
(Giorgi, 1970); Cognitive Anthropology (Tyler, 1969); and 
The Reality of Ethnomethodology (Mehan & Wood, 1975). Works 
consulted in educational philosophy included those commonly 
read by graduate students^for example! Patterns of Educa­
tional Philosophy (Brameld, 1971) and Philosophic Problems 
and Education (Pai & Myers, 1967). Among the especially 
valuable works in process philosophy were Philosophers of 
Process (Browning, 1965) and Whitehead on Education (Dunkel, 
1965). Freire's works (1971, 1973) were provocative 
exemplars of current curriculum theorizing in an actual 
educational setting. Among the helpful sources from the 
field of anthropology most directly related to education 
were "Attitude Organization in Elementary School Classrooms" 
(Henry, 1974) and Freedom and Culture (Lee, 1959); from 
the field of communication theory, "Perception and 
Communication: A Transactional View," (Toch & MacLean, 
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1967) and The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communication 
(Matson & Montagu, 1967) and from general semantics "General 
Semantics: A Neglected Method in Philosophy of Education" 
(Winetrout & Pratte, 1973) and Teaching as a Subversive 
Activity (Postman & Weingartner, 1969). 
Interaction in the Model 
To consider the dynamics of her model, the investigator 
addressed herself to these kinds of questions regarding the 
relationships between teachers and students in the working 
of the model! How are settings, environments and persons 
related? Should the model focus on the schooling experience 
primarily or should it focus on the political and social 
world beyond the school? Is it true that the more things 
change in schools, the more they remain the same? Do 
teachers tend to treat students the way they themselves are 
treated by administrators? Are persons and institutions 
necessarily in conflict regarding their aims? Are clear 
cut distinctions between work and play necessary in students' 
and teachers' lives? Can students provide a major part of 
the input regarding their learning experiences at school? 
Have interactions in the school setting been based on 
borrowing from models in industry such as scientific manage­
ment or human relations models? To answer these questions 
for the section of her model dealing with interactions in 
the model, the investigator read Sarason's works concerned 
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with educational settings and roles within those settings 
such as The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change, 
The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies and Human 
Services and Resource Networks (1973, 1972, 1977). She also 
read Brubaker and Nelson's work on bureaucratic and profes­
sional models for governance and curriculum functions in 
school settings^ including Introduction to Educational 
Decision Making (1972) and Creative Survival in Educational 
Bureaucracies (1974) as well as much of Brubaker's other re­
cent work such as Creative Leadership in Elementary Schools 
(1976) and Secondary Social Studies for the 70's: Planning 
for Instruction (1973). The investigator found 
Sergiovanni1s work tracing the impact of various organization 
theories on educational administration helpful. She has 
read "The Odyssey of Organizational Theory in Education: 
Implications for Humanizing Education" (1976) as well as the 
book Sergiovanni wrote with Starratt, Emerging Patterns of 
Supervision: Human Perspectives (1971). Wilson, Shapiro, 
et. aJ.'s Sociology of Supervision (1969) was valuable for 
a history of the emergence of supervision as a specialized 
function in America. Recent work of reconceptualists such 
as Apple and Kings', "What Do Schools Teach," (1977) was 
also utilized as was Stratemeyer's classic Developing a 
Curriculum for Modern Living (1947). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, a model is a symbolic 
device for abstracting and categorizing essential aspects 
of the process of interest. In this chapter the model will 
be described and explained. The model is concerned with 
the liberating of persons through education rather than 
rendering them more easily controlled through education. 
Taken for granted ways of seeing the world must undergo 
critical examination by any person hoping to create a 
novel theoretical model. Such a person does well to bear 
in mind the old truism that it was not the fish who dis­
covered water. Therefore, this chapter begins with a 
section concerned with the power of taken for granted ways 
of seeing the world, herein called domain assumptions. 
Understandings about how the world really "is" used by 
groups of persons to order their world and to make sense out 
of it are intimately connected with the words used to 
create concepts and categories. Domain assumptions are 
reliant on and formulated in terms of language. Therefore, 
human language influences and variations are briefly 
discussed next in this chapter. 
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This writer believes that all human endeavors, in­
cluding model creation, grow out of the doers implicit or 
explicit philosophical orientation. Therefore the specific 
axiological, ontological and epistemological bases of the 
model are given. Indeed, the model is created through its 
philosophical orientation, made explicit. The last section 
of this chapter is concerned with interaction in the 
model, since persons learn and create their personal cur­
riculum through their relationships with other persons. 
Domain Assumptions and Language 
The categories which groups of humans create to make 
sense out of their world are intimately connected with their 
language. Whorf has questioned," 
How does such a network of language, culture and 
behavior come about historically? Which was first: 
the language patterns or the cultural norms? In 
the main they have grown up together, constantly 
influencing each other. But in this partnership 
the nature of language is the factor that limits 
free plasticity and rigidifies channels of 
development in the more autocratic way. This is 
so because a language is a system, not just an 
assemblage of norms. Large systematic outlines 
can change to something really new only very 
slowly while many other cultural innovations are 
made with comparative quickness. Language thus 
represents the mass mind; it is affected by in­
ventions and innovations, but affected little and 
slowly, whereas to inventors and innovators it 
legislates with the decree immediate. (Whorf, 
1956, 156) 
Wendell Johnson has explained; 
There is a basic scheme of classification built 
into our common speech and language. This built-
in classification system directs us so that we 
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observe the things we can readily classify with 
the names we know, while we tend strongly to 
overlook or disregard everything else. We see with 
our categories. (Postman and Weingartner, 1969, 
127) 
Domain Assumptions 
This section of the model chapter will explore briefly 
the concept of domain assumptions with some general illustra­
tions followed by some specific illustrations in education. 
The next section will indicate the respect for the power and 
relativity of human languages which can be gained by those 
who take language differences seriously and who examine them 
critically. The purpose of these sections is not to gener­
ate cynicism about the question of whether humans can know 
about the world in a real sense. Varying domain assumptions 
and language differences are seen as inherent in human 
groups but needing constant scrutiny by the curriculum 
theorist to evaluate their effectiveness in helping people 
to live in their world and to change their world. Domain 
assumptions and language differences are drawn on to indi­
cate that the curriculum theorizer adopting a process orien­
tation must be able to examine critically his or her own 
domain assumptions. Also he or she must have an apprecia­
tion for the ways the English language and inappropriate 
borrowing from certain professional languages have habitu­
ated certain thinking and acting patterns in the schools. 
38 
This model borrows the term "domain assumptions" from 
Alvin Gouldner, a sociologist, to indicate that a society's 
way of categorizing, organizing and explaining its reality 
tends to be both conventional and arbitrary^ while seeming 
to be neither, to the participants (Gouldner, 1970), Many 
other terms could have been used. Persons who have investi­
gated the idiosyncrasy of a group's reality have used many 
terms, such as "constitutive rules," "rules by which men 
live," "deep lying social constants," and "habits of 
thought,"* to conceptualize their ideas. Carroll Quigley 
speaks of a group's "system of categories and of valuations" 
or "cognitive system," calling these "the most important 
thing we can know about any society and the most difficult 
to learn " (Quigley, 1975, 22-3), Levi-Strauss specu­
lates, "Men's conception of the relationship between nature 
and culture is a function of modification of their own 
social relations " (Levi-Strauss, 1962, 117), In current 
popular literature Robert Pirsig explores Poincare's "con­
ventions " (Pirsig, 1974, 257), The domain assumptions which 
persons immersed in a given culture internalize consciously 
and unconsciously are significant for as Gouldner explains 
they ̂ 
entail beliefs about what is real in the world and 
thus have implications about what it is possible 
*See for example Apple, 1975, 128; Barton, 1950, 12 and 
Smith, 1950, 7. 
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to do, to change in the world; the values they en­
tail indicate what courses of action are desirable 
and thus shape conduct. (Gouldner, 1970, 47-8) 
He elaborates that domain assumptions are always implicitly 
present in theory construction and that it is much easier 
for persons to accept theories which do not contradict their 
habitual ways of seeing the world. 
The general semanticist warns tfe-at the map is not the 
territory. This statement can be extended to the idea that 
just as maps vary among perceivers, so also does the nature 
of the territories themselves. This investigator will 
briefly indicate a few directions pursued especially by 
anthropologists which could be elaborated and expanded by 
others interested in the idiosyncrasy of human perception 
and human domain assumptions. Two very basic concepts will 
be discussed. The concepts are color and time. Color per­
ception and interpretation vary not only from one individual 
to the next but also from one culture to the next. Claude 
Levi-Strauss has discussed a particular classification of 
colors not based on brightness and intensity but rather on 
relative light and relative darkness with a further distinc­
tion regarding those colors appearing in succulent plants 
and those appearing in dry plants. Thus a color appearing 
shiny brown, quite akin to red to the anthropologist is 
perceived by the native in one society as close to green 
(Levi-Strauss, 1962, 55), Robbins Burling has reported that 
the number of basic colors identified by a given group and 
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used by them varies, sometimes with distinctions only made 
between black and white (Burling, 1970, 48). Paul Henle 
discusses the Navaho making distinctions among what we call 
white, red and yellow but not distinguishing among what we 
would call gray, brown, blue and green. Henle notes of the 
Navaho, "They do not suffer from a peculiar form of color­
blindness any more than we do since we lack words for the 
two sorts of black which they distinguish " (Henle, 1965, 
8)e Basic assumptions about time (and therefore about 
space, motion and position) differ depending on the thought 
pattern and language being used. Several investigators 
have been interested in the Hopi notion of "time" which is 
more operational, more world-in-process, than ours. Whorf 
has explained that the Hopi conceptualize "time" as 
"exhibition of dynamic effort in a certain process" (Whorf, 
1956, 57) rather than as past, present or future. Expres­
sions such as "while morning-phase is occuring" are used 
rather than "in the morning " (Whorf, 1956, 143), The 
expressions are not used as nouns. The Hopi see reality in 
terms of Events or as Whorf suggests, in terms of "Event­
ing " (Whorf, 1956, 147). He elaborates, "Everything is 
thus already 'prepared' for the way it now manifests by 
earlier phases, and what it will be later, partly has been, 
and partly is in the act of being so 'prepared.' An em­
phasis and importance rests on this preparing or being pre­
pared aspect of the world that may to the Hopi correspond 
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to that 'quality of reality' that 'matter' or 'stuff' has 
for us " (Whorf, 1956, 148). Whorf explains that Hopi 
process thought patterns would be valuable to the scientist 
in the twentieth century. "Hopi, with its preferences for 
verbs, as contrasted to our own liking for nouns, per­
petually turns our propositions about things into proposi­
tions about events " (Whorf, 1956, 63). The Hopi do not 
think in terms such as ten days, for ten days cannot be ex­
perienced. Only this day can be lived. Therefore they use 
expressions such as "after the tenth day" instead (Whorf, 
1956, 140), Whorf discusses what he calls Standard Average 
European (SAE) "objectification of time " (Whorf, 1956, 140)) 
the tendency to think that time can be quantified, cut up into 
segments. Edward Hall has discussed the Eskimo incredulity 
that work should start and stop because of a shrill whistle 
as contrasted with work in a rhythm based on the tides 
(Hall, 1976, 17), Richard Marsh has examined Oriental con­
cepts of time as being less linear and more circular than 
SAE time. He talks about the Oriental "next-time around 
attitude" (Marsh, 1969, 113) which assumes a fullness in 
time with opportunities evolving over centuries of endless 
time rather than the notion that it's now or never. 
By considering a few varying human conceptions of such 
basic concepts as color and time, the curriculum theorist 
can begin to ponder many domain assumptions automatically 
carried over from the larger society to the school. 
42 
Domain assumptions operating in education should be closely 
examined by the curriculum theorist since these persons more 
than practitioners have the responsibility to ask the most 
basic questions out of which new theory can evolve. Be­
havioral approaches to curriculum are in fashion with such 
current forms as competency based education and accountabil­
ity. Herbert Kliebard draws the curriculum theorist's at­
tention to behaviorism enshrined as virtual canon law in 
education today (Kliebard, 1975, 64), The questions Ralph 
Tyler identified as basic in 1949 continue to dominate cur­
riculum theory today. The questions are: 
1. What educational purposes should the school seek 
to attain? 
2. What educational experiences can be provided that 
are likely to attain these purposes? 
3. How can these educational experiences be ef­
fectively organized? 
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are 
being attained? (Tyler, 1949, 1) 
Tyler has noted that objectives must be determined at the 
start for they "become the criteria by which materials are 
selected, content outlined, instructional procedures are 
developed, and tests and examinations are prepared " (Tyler, 
1949, 3). In the introduction to a series of papers from a 
major curriculum theory conference, held in 1950, Virgil 
Herrick and Ralph Tyler have stated the place of objectives 
in education*. "The crucial importance of educational 
objectives in curriculum development is almost an axiom " 
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(Tyler & Herrick, 1950, 2), To those attending the confer­
ence, they must have seemed to have been "givens," not to 
be questioned. But in the same publication, which is en­
titled Toward Improved Curriculum Theory, George Barton 
says, "The rules by which men live should become objects of 
study and reconstruction " (Barton, 1950, 12). Alex Molnar 
and John Zahorik observe in a 1977 Association for Super­
vision and Curriculum Development publication, Curriculum 
Theory J 
The power and impact of the Tyler model cannot 
be overstated. Virtually every person who has ever 
been in a teacher education program has been intro­
duced to this model. It has become synonymous 
with curriculum work at all levels. Teachers, cur­
riculum committees, and curriculum theorists have 
perceived the asking and answering of Tyler's 
four questions as their main task. 
The pervasive Tyler model, then, embodies 
the "common sense" of our culture. The four de­
cisions reflect the prevailing assumptions about 
people and how they should be in relation to one 
another. To stand outside of Tyler is to stand 
outside of the dominant assumptions of American 
culture. The rationale, however, does not allow 
for substantive changes in the status quo. 
(Molnar & Zahorik, 1977, 3) 
Noam Chomsky has called behavioral approaches to the 
acquisition of knowledge "a curious deviation from normal 
scientific practice " (Chomsky, 1975, 75). He questions the 
idea that general theories of learning exist. (Chomsky, 
1975, 159) Many other..psychologists such a^ Bruner do also 
(Bruner, 1960, 1966), 
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Wolfson suggests study of factors making a difference in human 
interaction as a curriculum focus (Wolfson, 1966, 27)^ Apple 
discusses the operation of "latent assumptions" and habits 
of thought determining "taken-for-granted" reality saying 
they "set the boundaries of curricularists' imaginations and 
provide a fundamental framework for a large portion of the 
problematic activities of schooling " (Apple, 1975c, b, 
115, 121), He writes of students now questioning "consti­
tutive rules" and their "alienation from imposition of 
obligatory meaning structures " (Apple, 1975b, 128). He 
calls for examination of "accepted commonsense conceptions 
of competence," calling for examination of "the basic 
regularities of the institutional structure of schooling 
itself. The regularities themselves are the 'teaching de­
vices' that communicate lasting norms and dispositions to 
students, that instruct children in 'how the world really 
is' " (Apple, 1975a, 141), He reminds educators that schools 
do not exist in a vacuum. Dwayne Huebner, who has discussed 
various value orientations behind the school experience, 
points out, "Narrow concerns for effectiveness, behavioral 
objectives, and principles of learning have hidden much 
broader problems of economic and technical policies per­
taining to education " (Huebner, 1974, 47), Seymour 
Sarason's use of an outerspace man to consider behavioral 
and programmatic regularities of the typical school from a 
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fresh viewpoint could be useful (Sarason, 1971)« One needs 
to see the basic assumptions of the curriculum theorist 
from unusual, foreign perspectives also. 
Also it would be a useful exercise to have persons 
tease out and play with domain assumptions in particular 
disciplines now being taught in the schools. For examplej 
domain assumptions in American history instruction include 
such generalizations as the inevitability of the expansion 
of certain peoples across the planet, and the necessity 
of the western hemisphere being "discovered" by Europeans 
(Moran, 1969, 104), Native Americans and minorities seem 
to be of incidental interest and artificial chronologies 
take the student from president to president or from war 
to war. Apple observes that "consensus" and "happy co­
operation" are presented as having been norms of American 
life through history (Apple, 1975c, 105). 
Language 
What are the characteristics of humans that define 
them as a distinct species? Noam Chomsky has seen the 
acquisition of human language as an extraordinary ac­
complishment, as that which makes persons human. Discus­
sing the differences between human language and the 
linguistic capabilities of species such as apes, Chomsky 
uses an exaggerated analogy. He notes that humans are able 
to jump, albeit less well than other creatures. Since 
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jumping and flying are both types of locomotion, since both 
involve movement up and down and since humans can develop 
their capacity to improve jumping, Chomsky asks^ Does this 
mean that flying and jumping are not so very different? Does 
it mean, "People can really fly, just like birds only less 
well?" (Chomsky, 1975, 41 )„ Can apes talk like persons only 
less well? Chomsky says no.* He notes the ease with which 
virtually all human children acquire language without specif­
ic training and thinks of the human mind as, "specifically 
developed to accomplish this task " (Chomsky, 1975, 13), 
Alfred Korzybski has identified the concept of time binding 
to exemplify the fact that through human language, human ex­
periences are preserved from one generation to the next and 
each new generation is not starting from scratch. Korzybski 
explores the notion that through language human powers of 
abstracting are virtually infinite. Much of Korzybski's 
concern in founding general semantics came from his perception 
of the dangers of careless human abstraction through unex­
amined language usage (Korzybski, 1948, 187)# 
Another consideration about human language will be 
briefly explored here. Can significance be attached to the 
way that literacy itself influences persons' perceptions? 
Paulo Freire, who has worked with illiteracy in South 
America, writes about the illiterate person as oppressed by 
written words "kept imprisoned in the magic tool box of 
•Others disagree. See for example, Linden, Apes, Men, and 
Language. New York: Dutton, 1975. 
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those present day sorcerers, the stewards of the culture of 
silence " (Freire, 1973, viii). Jack Goody and I. Watt 
in an article entitled, "The Consequences of Literacy," 
explore the effects of literacy on persons and on their 
traditions. They quote Nietzche as saying western civiliza­
tion is populated by "wandering encyclopedias," unable to 
function in the present but weighed down by "a historical 
sense that injures and finally destroys the living thing, 
be it a man, or a people or a system of culture " (Goody 
& Watt, 1973, 340), Goody and Watt say that illiterate 
societies have a "structural amnesia" (Goody & Watt, 1973, 
340) which literate societies lack. The former are able 
to continually transform their traditions and their history 
to make them relevant to the current needs of the group. 
Also, reliance on oral communication makes for a more in­
timate relationship between symbols and referents since 
words do not accumulate layers of meaning over time. Goody 
and Watt discuss the evolution of the Greek alphabet and 
of Greek thought. "It is surely significant that it was 
only in the days of the first wide-spread alphabetic cul­
ture that the idea of 'logic'—of an immutable and imper­
sonal mode of discourse--appears to have arisen; and it 
was also only then that the sense of the human past as an 
objective reality was formally developed " (Goody & Watt, 
1973, 331-2), A brief discussion will now explore what it 
means to say that language usage encourages certain kinds 
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of categorizations and distinctions. The general semanticist 
explains that meanings are in people, not in words. This 
can be carried a step further. In addition to the statement 
applying to individual persons, it can also apply to groups 
of persons. Meanings are defined in part by group usage 
and group environment. The linguist and the anthropolo­
gist have discovered that languages differ in such things 
as the kinds of vocabulary distinctions persons are led to 
make. For examplej Stephen Tyler describes how the Koyas of 
South India do not distinguish between dew, fog, ice or 
snow but have at least seven different terms for the plant 
Americans call bamboo and very specific terms for cousins 
on differing sides of the family (Tyler, 1969, 3). Es­
kimos have a multitude of terms for snow (Marsh, 1969, 
112), In America only the skier makes such fine distinctions. 
The English speaker has three singular and three plural 
personal pronouns with which to categorize persons. The 
Palaung people in Burma have eleven possibilities in con­
trast to the English six possibilities. They make pro­
vision for such forms as you and I, he or she and I, and 
they and you (Burling, 1970, 14-15), Dorothy Lee has 
studied the language forms of the Wintu people for whom the 
unique individual self is not of primary importance. The 
third person pronoun form is primary with the first person 
singular form a variant of it (Lee, 1959, 38), Languages 
differ in the kinds of grammatical observations which must 
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be made just as they differ in vocabulary distinctions. In 
NavahOj for example, statements must be made much more spec­
ific than they need be in English. The English sentence, 
"I drop it," is incredibly vague to the Navaho who must 
specify in his language whether what was dropped was liquid, 
living, round or long. Furthermore^ agency must be more 
clearly delineated as well as time considerations including 
such distinctions as whether the act is stopping or start­
ing, habitual, etc. (Henle, 1965, 9-10)0 
The tendency of English speakers to dichotomize, to 
see reality in terms of opposites has been widely noted by 
persons in many diverse fields from education to general 
semantics, to anthropology.* Richard Marsh explains that 
this is not a universal among languages. "The Oriental 
languages, however, are so constructed that it's more dif­
ficult to separate in your mind one quality from its op­
posite. In the Oriental view, opposites are not opposed. 
They arise mutually; they are complementary " (Marsh, 
1969, 110)e Marsh calls such languages "multi-valued" 
and English "two valued " (Marsh, 1969, HO), 
*This is a continuing theme in Dewey's writings on educa­
tion and a major concern of the general semanticist who 
urges us to avoid artificial splits caused by word usage. 
Cognitive anthropologists such as Tyler (1969) and 
Diamond (1974) have spoken to this also. 
A discussion of the idibsyncracies of given languages 
inherent in the languages themselves may lead the question 
what difference does it make to real persons? An example 
concerning sex bias in English usage will be briefly given 
here to indicate the kinds of analyses which could be done 
Robert Baker has noted that in our society one's sex is of 
such importance that pronouns make designations according 
to sex rather than other possible categories such as re­
ligious beliefs, social standing, age, parentage or race 
(Baker, 1975, 45-64 )f Whorf has questioned the seeming 
naturalness of the English language's "covert system" of 
gender classification (Whorf, 1956, 90). He notes that 
there are many more personal masculine or feminine names 
than there are sexual classifications of objects. These 
personal names must be memorized regarding the sex of the 
person to whom they can refer. Also the classifications 
are not self-evident. "Natural properties" themselves 
can't tell us that ghosts are referred to as ̂ t, nature as 
she and small boats as she. Whorf concludes, "The mis­
takes in English gender made by learners of the language, 
including those whose own languages are without gender, 
would alone show that we have here covert grammatical 
categories and not reflections in speech of natural and 
noncultural differences " (Whorf, 1956, 90-92), Ann 
Bodine has analyzed English and American grammar books 
through history as well as those in current use. She has 
determined that according to English pronoun usage, males 
are considered to be more important than females. Bodine 
cites Poole writing in 1646' 
The Relative agrees with the Antecedent in gender, 
number, and person. . . . The Relative shall agree 
in gender with the Antecedent of the more worthy 
gender: as the King and the Queen whom I honor. 
The Masculine gender is more worthy than the 
Feminine. (Bodine, 1975, 134) 
She also cites a grammar book written in 1967 and still in 
use today in which Roberts talks about "following the con­
vention that, grammatically, men are more important than 
women " (Bodine, 1975, 140), Research studies have shown 
that the supposedly generic he is frequently ambiguously 
interpreted or interpreted to include only males.* Bodine 
a linguist, concludes, "Personal reference, including 
personal pronouns, is one of the most socially significant 
aspects of language " (Bodine, 1975, 144). 
One of the functions of language is that of helping 
humans to place things in categories, to make distinctions 
The general semanticist warns that the word is not the 
thing and that whatever we say a thing is, it is not. 
A. B. Johnson notes that humans "disregard the individual­
ity of nature and substitute a generality which belongs to 
language " (Johnson, 1949, 188), A human tendency to 
*See Powers and Mamola (1977) for a summary of studies and 
for additional references. 
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categorize and then ignore the uniqueness of each item so 
categorized leads the general semanticist to call for per­
sons to "think the index." While all of the children are 
students, student^ is not student2> is not student3- So 
enamored can a given group of people be of their terms 
and (to them) their neat categories, that they forget the 
arbitrary nature of those terms. Differing systems of 
assigning names to persons can be glanced at to point to 
ways of stipulating names which are different from English 
stipulations. Levi-Strauss has found some interesting 
variations in naming. In groups such as the Iroquois, two 
persons cannot bear the same first name. The Yurok in 
California sometimes wait six or more years until a person 
dies, freeing a name for a new person. The Dakota have 
certain specific names assigned to children according to 
sex and according to birth order. In some groups going 
through certain phases of life leads to the acquisition of 
a new name. Sometimes a child's name is changed according 
to a prescribed formula if a sibling dies (Levi-Strauss, 
1962, 188-90), 
The language used by those in education needs careful 
examination. Michael Apple and others have observed that 
the words used by humans in any endeavor are never neutral 
and that careful consideration must be given to the impact 
and control wrought by the kinds of words that are now 
employed (Apple, 1975a, 123), What and whose political 
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ends do they serve? Do we label students to help them or to 
avoid responsibility for their school failure? Huebner 
provides a valuable way of looking at curricular languages. 
He has classified them as being determined by these value 
systems: technical, political, scientific, esthetic, and 
ethical (Huebner, 1975a, 223-8). Huebner observes that the 
technical approach with its means and ends behavioral 
rationality does have its place but he cautions, "To reduce 
all curricular thought to this one is to weaken the 
educator's power and to pull him out of the mysteriously 
complex phenomena of human life " (Huebner, 1975a, 224)„ 
Apple questions the borrowing of curricular language from 
behavioral psychology. He writes." 
The terminology drawn from this psychology and 
its allied fields is quite inadequate since it 
neglects or at best tends to draw attention from 
the basically political and moral character of 
social existence and human development. The lan­
guage of reinforcement, learning, negative feedback, 
and so forth is a rather weak tool for dealing 
with the continual encroachment of chaos upon 
order, with the creation and recreation of personal 
meaning and interpersonal institutions, with the 
political nature of schooling and other insti­
tutions, and with notions such as responsibility 
and justice in conduct with others. (Apple, 
1975a, 139) 
He concludes that usage of the language of psychology has 
taken ethical and political considerations out of the cur­
riculum theorist's work. Apple deplores the situation 
wherein students are "transformed into manipulable and 
anonymous abstractions called 'learners' " (Apple, 1975a, 139)^ 
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He cites Friedrichs who has raised the same kinds of ques­
tions in the field of sociology. The curriculum theorizer 
can also look at the question of limited perspectives on 
humans in the field of psychology as discussed by Giorgi 
(Giorgi, 1970). DeLoria has spoken to this question regarding 
religion and the person (DeLoria, 1973, 189-208),. Huebner 
calls for contributions to curricular language from the 
fields of art, philosophy and theology (Huebner, 1966, 
18)f Philip Phenix's general dispositions would be valuable 
starting points for the curriculum theorist. The disposi-
tions are hope, creativity, awareness, doubt and faith, 
wonder, awe, and reverence, united with a concern for whole­
ness (Phenix, 1975, 328-33). 
Axiological Orientation 
Macdonald and others have shown that all curriculum 
theories are value statements, explicitly or impxicitly 
stated (Macdonald, 1977), Ralph Tyler has suggested that 
the curriculum theorist should have a philosophy but Tyler 
makes no presumptions about what that philosophy should be 
beyond statements such as this, "Quite commonly educational 
philosophies in a democratic society are likely to empha­
size strongly democratic values " (Tyler, 1949, 34 )p He 
asks whether schools should endeavor to adjust students to 
society or prepare them to change society without taking a 
stand on the question himself. It seems to this writer 
55 
that Tyler's rationale leaves room for Dewey's more ef­
ficient burglar to come back and haunt persons in education 
if they fail to state their values clearly (Dewey, 1938, 
28), The axiological grounding of this dissertation model 
is a contextual, process, existential one. Stephen 
Pepper's root metaphor for a contextual world hypothesis 
as "the active present event . . . the event alive in its 
present" (Pepper, 1970, 232) is valuable for this model. 
Pepper explains, "We may call it an 'act,' if we like, 
and if we take care of our use of the terms. But it is not 
an act conceived as alone or cut off from what we mean; it 
is an act in and with its setting, an act in its context " 
(Pepper, 1970, 232). The contextual world hypothesis has 
similarities to the Hopi conception of reality and to the 
twentieth century scientists' and general semanticists' 
process orientation. Pepper has saidf 
To give instances of this root metaphor in our 
language with the minimum risk of misunderstanding, 
we should use only verbs. It is doing, and en­
during and enjoying: making a boat, running a 
race, laughing at a joke, persuading an assembly. 
. . . These acts or events are all intrinsically 
complex, composed of interconnected activities 
with continuously changing patterns. . . . They 
are literally the incidents of life. . . . The 
contextualist finds that everything in the world 
consists of such incidents. . . . Contextualism 
holds tight to the changing present events. 
(Pepper, 1970, 232-33) 
This model is grounded in holistic conceptions of per­
sons and of events. The whole, be it a person or an 
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event is more, much more than the sum of particular parts. 
Attempts to isolate elements invariably lead to distortion. 
Can the person be essentalized into "the learner"? Can the 
cognitive, affective and psychomotor capacities of persons 
be isolated and considered individually? This model says 
no. 
With stress placed on events, this model further 
stresses the quality of the present event which reaches for­
ward and backward through time. To impose a linear or 
point-in-time framework onto a given event has been useful 
and convenient for Western thought but not helpful when 
considering the intuited event. Duration is a better 
way to conceive of the intuited event. "As far as the 
event quality extends, so far does the event extend, so 
far does the actual present extend " (Pepper, 1970, 244), 
This is very different from thinking of education for 
students as contained in so many hours, units of instruc­
tion or pages in a book. The quality of the present, 
lived-in experience of the student in school is of primary 
importance in this dissertation. All other considerations 
must be measured against that pivotal one. All experiences 
are inter-related, connected. As Dewey has observed, some 
educational experiences can be mis-educative (Dewey, 1938, 
13)# Experiences which distort, deceive or bore the 
student are not educative experiences. If the student is 
not desirous of learning more, then the experience has not 
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been educative for him and the event has been a non-event 
for him. Further, there is no such thing as an educational 
event in isolation. Ultimately each private event emerges 
into public, broader events. What happens to the student 
at home, at school, ultimately touches and influences other 
lives, other events, endlessly. Whitehead has spoken to 
this in a powerful way. "Everything is thus actually a 
part of all that to which it is related and to speak of the 
identity and location of something is merely to specify a 
focal point in this network of relations which stretches 
through the universe " (Dunkel, 1965, 34). 
In the axiological grounding of this model, change is 
what is to be expected in human affairs rather than perman­
ence. Change is continuous, unending. Everything in the 
universe is constantly changing. Permanence is unprovable. 
New aspects of emerging events are continually manifest. 
The old saying, "There is nothing new under the sun," is 
completely false. Actually the sun itself is constantly a 
new event. Huebner expressed this well in writing that 
instead of educators helping students to adjust to change 
as an unwelcome break in expected permanencies, non-change 
should be seen as the anomaly (Huebner, 1975b, 241X The 
maturing student himself or herself is a person in process, 
changing and growing. The student creates himself or her­
self, as do all persons. Facilitative teachers help but 
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cannot force the self-creation of students in a particular 
pattern. Teachers are responsible for enhancing the self-
creation of students but must not impose their ready-made 
patterns on students. 
Achievement of the most satisfactory patterning of the 
mutual relations that constitute the ever emerging student 
is the goal of education regarding a given student. The 
final test emerges in the student's desire to make real 
creative, novel possibilities in the world and her life's 
efforts doing so. Does the person strive for ever better, 
more satisfactory, more comprehensive, more ethical pat­
terns of relationship and responsibility? Whitehead has 
said, "The aim of education is the marriage of thought and 
action " (Dunkel, 1965, 94). 
Ontological Orientation 
In this model being is revealed through becoming. In­
deed all things however seemingly solid are actually in 
process, becoming. Dewey has written, "Anything defined 
as structure is a character of events, not something in­
trinsic and per se " (Dewey, 1965a, 247), He then discusses 
the seeming permanence of a house by way of illustration. 
Since our language is noun oriented, is thing rather than 
process oriented, it was unusual that Dewey would talk about 
a physical structure in this manner. However, to the 
Nootka Indians of Vancouver, whose everyday thought patterns 
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and language usage are more process oriented, such an ex­
pression is natural. The Nootka talk of a house as being 
more like a verb than a noun, as occurring, as becoming 
rather than being (Marsh, 1969, 111-112).. Charles 
Hartshorne has provided a helpful statement on becoming and 
being. "That may be said to be which is available for 
memory or perception, for integration into ever new acts of 
synthesis, and in this sense is a potential for all future 
becoming. To be is to be available for all future actuali­
ties " (Hartshorne, 1965, xix). Dewey has written about 
the human individual and becoming* 
The ground of democratic ideas and practices is 
faith in the potentialities of individuals, faith 
in the capacity for positive developments if 
proper conditions are provided. The weakness of 
the philosophy originally advanced to justify the 
democratic movement was that it took individuality 
to be something given ready-made, that is, in 
abstraction from time,instead of as a power to 
develop. (Dewey, 1965b,223) 
He has explained what is meant by potentiality* 
Potentiality is a category of existence, for develop­
ment cannot occur unless an individual has powers 
or capacities that are not actualized at a given 
time. But it also means that these powers are not 
unfolded from within, but are called out through 
interaction with other things. (Dewey, 1965b, 219) 
Dewey has observed that potentialities cannot be known in 
advance; they can only be comprehended after interactions 
have taken place. In considering the possibilities of each 
individual person Dewey has written; 
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Individuality conceived as a temporal development 
involves uncertainty, indeterminacy, or contin­
gency. Individuality is the source of whatever 
is unpredictable in the world. . . . Genuine 
individuality exists; individuality is pregnant 
with new developments. . . (Dewey, 1965b,221-2) 
In this model students and teachers are defined as persons-
in-process with potentialities to be mutually developed, 
mutually enhanced. Since the teacher has been engaged in 
his self-development for a longer time and in a more sys­
tematic manner, and since the teacher has freely chosen to 
make his life's work the facilitating of students' self-
development, the major responsibility for the initiation and 
enhancement of the interaction rests with him. The teacher 
in this model is hereby designated as a "certified learner" 
because of the greater range of educational experiences he 
has sought and had. However, all persons are seen as 
learners. Edward Hall writes of the distortion caused by 
those who see "education" and "learning" as synonomous and 
as confined to schools' 
The-popular notion is that the schools contain the 
learning and their job is somehow to get the 
learning into the child. In the United States, 
the process of distortion in education has pro­
gressed to a point comparable to sex in Freud's 
nineteenth-century Vienna. A natural, powerful, 
pleasureful drive that binds people to each 
other is not only feared but hated, which may ex­
plain some of the attitudes toward the intellect­
ual in our country. (Hall, 1976, 31) 
In this model, to be human is to be learning as long as one 
lives. The school experience encourages the student to 
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consider learning as an unending process. Considering the 
student as "learner," this writer sees the inadequacy of the 
term "learner" as well as of the term "student." Both terms 
are simplifications of complex persons-in-process. Huebner 
writes; 
Curricular language seems rather ludicrous when 
the complexity and the mystery of a fellow human 
being is encompassed in that technical term of 
control--the "learner." Think of it--there stand­
ing before the educator is a being partially 
hidden in the cloud of infinitudes; the theolo­
gian has preached of his depravity and hinted of 
his participation in the divine; the philosopher 
has struggled to encompass him in his systems, 
only to have him repeatedly escape; the novelist 
and dramatist have captured his fleeting moments 
of pain and purity in never-to-be forgotten 
esthetic forms; and the man engaged in curriculum 
has the temerity to reduce this being to a single 
term - "learner." (Huebner, 1975a, 219) 
Huebner suggests that provision be made by persons in cur­
riculum theory for the complexity and mystery of the human 
person. This model will follow a convention of the general 
semanticist who warns that words which are high level ab­
stractions should be so indicated by the use of quotes. 
For the rest of this dissertation the word "student" and the 
word "learner" will appear in quotes to indicate the over­
simplification of such designations. 
In this model the effective, authentic teacher is the 
person who does what she is becoming. To express it another 
way, she is not fragmented into contradictory roles. Her 
teaching and the rest of her life are of-a-piece. Her 
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life's work and her sharing of it with others through teach­
ing are mutually complementary, mutually congruent. Francine 
Shaw writes of the principle of congruence, 
If our lives are well-woven, well-balanced tapes­
tries, we can leave no incongruent juxtaposition 
unattended; congruence means that the threads of 
the Self weave a conceptual bond with and con­
tinuity between our theories and experiences, work 
and creative practices, our relation to students 
and the atmosphere we provide for them. (Shaw, 
1975, 446) 
Writing further about the teacher. Shaw concludes, 
We must be in the process of growth we help our 
students to experience, be what we help others 
to become; we must be what we do, live what we 
do. . . . Attaining this balance must be our 
immediate concern if we are to be what we help 
others to experience in a meaningful way, or, 
more profoundly, be in the process of becoming 
what we help others to become. (Shaw, 1975, 
446, 450) 
Through holistic concepts of "certified learners" and of 
"learners," persons in curriculum theorizing can help all 
persons in education to move toward terms more generative, 
and more filled with consideration for the potential of 
persons. Michael Polanyi writes of "a society of ex­
plorers " (Polanyi, 1966, 83), That seems to be a fruitful 
way of thinking and conceptualizing as does Freire's idea 
of educator-educatee relationships (Freire, 1973, viii). 
Epistemological Orientation 
This model is grounded in particular, general assump­
tions concerning the nature of all human knowledge and in 
more specific assumptions concerning the student and 
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knowledge. The particular, general assumptions will be con­
sidered first, followed by the more specific assumptions. 
The most basic assumption is that all human knowledge is 
grounded in human interest. Macdonald has elaborated, 
"This interest may be fundamental self-preservation, but 
even self-preservation cannot be defined independently of 
the cultural conditions of work, language, and power " 
(Macdonald, 1975a, 287). Another assumption is that humans 
are learners, knowledge seekers as part of their essential 
humanness. Dewey has said, "Growth is the characteristic 
of life—education is all one with growing; it has no end 
beyond itself (Dewey, 1944, 53), Israel Scheffler's ob­
servation that learning is a process and therefore fre­
quently not necessarily deliberate or intentional, accords 
with Dewey's words (Scheffler, 1965, 10), as does Thomas 
Kuhn's comment that the knower can never be aware of the 
full ramifications, implications of what she knows. Kuhn 
asksjWho discovered Oxygen, Priestly or Lavoisier? Is 
knowing that the same as knowing what? (Kuhn, 1962, 55-56)» 
The "what'could be interpreted as the importance of knowing 
"so what," which can never be fully comprehended or fully 
completed. 
Human knowledge does not consist of fixed, static 
achievements. By its very nature, human knowledge is active 
and changing. Although it is convenient for educators to 
think in terms of bodies of knowledge, such as the disciplines^ 
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this thinking can lead to persons conceptualizing knowledge 
as a body of facts to be mastered or packaged in some way. 
Human knowledge is not knowledge of things in the world 
which exist entirely independent of human knowing. For 
humans it is not the objects in the world themselves that 
are important, but rather their human use, the action, the 
event of their utilization. Jean Piaget discusses this re­
garding a child's concepts of logical thought and pebbles 
used to explore, to play out these concepts. It is not the 
pebbles which are significant to the child or to the per­
son studying the child. Rather, the child's use of the 
pebbles is significant (Piaget, 1970, 16-17). 
Dewey has written about the mistake of assuming objects 
can be studied without regard to the "learner's" actual 
use of them. 
Witness the different attitude of a boy in making, 
say, a kite, with respect to the grain and other 
properties of wood, the matter of size, angles, 
and proportion of parts, to the attitude of a 
pupil who has an object-lesson on a piece of 
wood, where the sole function of wood and its 
properties is to serve as subject matter for 
the lesson. (Dewey, 1944, 199) 
Stephen Tyler makes the same point in his cognitive anthro­
pology work. He declares that the object of the anthro­
pologist's study consists of "not material phenomena them­
selves but the way they are organized in the minds of 
men. . . . Cultures are not material phenomena but are 
cognitive organizations of material phenomena " (Tyler, 
1969, 3). 
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Human knowledge does not involve absolute certainty. 
Rather, in Scheffler's terms, human investigations into the 
nature of knowledge have as their aim, "not to judge the 
truth infallibly but to estimate the truth responsibly " 
(Scheffler, 1965, 54). Piaget has characterized the ap­
proximations of human knowledge as "a system of transfor­
mations that become progressively adequate " (Piaget, 1970, 
15X Ethnomethodologists such as Harold Garfinkel, Hugh 
Mehan and Houston Wood hold the position that all human 
knowledge is ideosyncratic and relative. They state that 
all human knowledge about phenomena is ' 
dependent upon ceaseless (1) reflexive use of 
(2) bodies of social knowledge in (3) interac­
tion. As this reflexive interactional work 
assembles the reality, without it, the reality 
could not be sustained. Hence, each reality 
(4) is fragile. Insofar as people may ex­
perience more than one reality, realities are 
said to be (5) permeable. (Mehan & Wood, 1975, 6) 
Human knowledge is holistic. Above all, it is char­
acterized by coherence and connectedness. No fact is true 
in some sort of spendid isolation. Inter-relationships, 
in which more and more coherence is attained by the knower, 
describe the human search for knowledge. Brand Blanshard 
has said, "The degree of truth of a particular proposition 
is to be judged in the first instance by its coherence with 
experience as a whole " (Blanshard, 1967, 193), Freire 
makes a useful distinction between "creative assimilation," 
as opposed to "information storing " (Freire, 1973, 46). 
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Human knowledge Is somewhat determined by the physio­
logical make-up of humans which sets some limits and has 
some implications for their ability to know and their ways 
of knowing. Polanyi reminds humans, "Our body is the ul­
timate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether 
intellectual or practical " (Polanyi, 1966, 15), Bearing 
this in mind, Huebner's discussion of possibility is 
valuable. "Possibility does not reside within the neuro­
logical structure of the individual. It exists at the 
boundary between the individual and the life styles that 
have been forged by all our predecessors and left in the 
tools, images, habits, institutions, memories and visions 
embodied in the public world " (Huebner, 1975d, 37)t 
Piaget and Chomsky suggest that persons interested in human 
ways of knowing study closely the mental development of the 
young child as a kind of mirror of the mental development of 
humans through their history (Piaget, 1970, Chomsky, 1975). 
Specific assumptions about the "student" and knowledge 
will now be explored. 
In this model the "student's" desire to know is seen as 
an active phenomenon. The acquisition of knowledge leads 
to the desire for further knowledge. One could askjDoes 
the "student" have more questions after studying the topic 
in class than she had at the beginning? Does she have more 
interest after studying the topic in class than she had at 
the beginning? The 'fetudent's" knowledge must be significant 
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to the "student" or it is not likely to be assimilated, 
internalized as knowledge. Human interest here becomes the 
"student's" own authentic interest as self-defined. 
Postman and Weingartner relate a telling anecdote. The 
teacher asks a child in science class, 'How many legs does 
a grasshopper have?' The student replies, 'Oh, man, I sure 
wish I had your problems!' (Postman & Weingartner, 1969, 
93), Postman and Weingartner ask, "Would you penalize the 
boy for having different purposes from his teacher and, 
therefore, for his valuing and perceiving a different 
reality?" (Postman & Weingartner, 1969, 93). The general 
semanticist's caution, "Meanings are in people, not in 
words," is significant here. The teacher cannot assume that 
any given subject has automatic, built-in interest for the 
"student." Dewey has said, "It is not the subject per se 
that is educative or that is conducive to growth. There is 
no subject that is in and of itself, or without regard to 
the stage of growth attained by learner, such that inherent 
educational value can be attributed to it " (Dewey, 1933, 
46). 
David Pears explains that factual knowledge may usefully 
be considered as "a state of mind . . . not a continuously 
busy state; it is more like being in good working order than 
actually working " (Pears, 1971, 9), In this model the 
"student's" working-order-knowledge includes both knowing 
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how and being able but neither one in any absolute sense. 
For example a "student" knows how to balance a checkbook 
and is able to do so. However, the "student" may be able 
to perform a gymnastics feat such as a back walk-over 
without knowing how he did it. Or he may know how to cal­
culate the distance between the earth and a million different 
stars without being practically able to do so. Also, pro­
vision must be made for that which the student knows but 
cannot tell, cannot articulate. Polanyi has spoken to this 
at length as tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966), 
I *  
A distinction must be made concerning the student's true 
knowing and her appearance of knowing. That which is 
guessed is not known. That which is occasionally true, but 
not consistently true is not known. Bertrand Russell's il­
lustration of the broken clock which is correct twice every 
twenty-four hours, demonstrates this idea. That which is 
memorized to please the teacher or fulfill a course require­
ment is not known. Worse, that which is memorized may be 
destructive of what the "student" has known. Dean Barnlund 
gives an illustration about a child raised in a Canadian 
cattle farming area who moved to India" 
Thora came home the other day doggedly repeating 
to herself, "A cow is a big animal with four 
legs and two horns. It is the most useful of 
all animals. The feet of the cow are called 
hoofs." I asked what she was doing, repeating 
this over and over again, and she replied that 
this was nature study and she had to memorize 
the cow. The teacher will not tolerate 
69 
improvised replies, but the students must jump 
up smartly beside their desks and repeat exactly 
what was copied from the blackboard the day be­
fore. It sounds fantastic, but the end of the 
system is to stifle initiative, destroy crea­
tivity and engender a violent dislike for 
learning. (Barnlund, 1968, 29) 
A recent article in the Charlotte Observer discussed North 
Carolina "students'" inability to explain the meaning of 
the pledge of allegiance, indeed to even know all of the 
words in the pledge (Lione, 1977, 1). All too often 
mere verbal dispositions are inadequate, quickly forgotten 
and not significant to the "learner." Knowing the word is 
not the same as knowing about the thing or event itself. 
The inadequacy of knowing the name has been discussed by 
many writers in education. Bloom and Krathwohl give an 
example of Dewey's experience with a class. He began', 
"What would you find if you dug a hole in the 
earth?" Getting no response, he repeated the 
question; again he obtained nothing but silence. 
The teacher chided Dr. Dewey, "You're asking 
the wrong question." Turning to the class 
she asked, "What is the state of the center of 
the earth?" The class replied in unison, 
"Igneous fusion." (Bloom & Krathwohl, 1966, 23) 
The student ultimately creates her own truth, her own 
knowledge, her own world in a process Brubacher has dis­
cussed as verification, quite literally "truth-making " 
(Brubacher, 1967, 250-1), Freire is most forceful. "'I 
want to learn to read and write so I can change the world', 
said an illiterate from Sao Paulo, for whom to know quite 
correctly meant to intervene in his reality " (Freire, 1973, 
50), 
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Looking at the student and knowledge, and Scheffler's 
question about how much of what an individual knows did she 
set out to learn (Scheffler, 1965, 10); the concept of the 
hidden curriculum is pertinent. Dewey has written 
Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies 
is the notion that a person learns only the 
particular thing he is studying at the time. 
Collateral learning in the way of formation of 
enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may 
be and often is much more important than the 
spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history 
that is learned. For these attitudes are 
fundamentally what count in the future. (Dewey, 
1938, 48) 
Curriculum as Process 
In this model the curriculum is continually evolving, 
being created by the "student" and the "certified learners" 
together as they draw on a wide range of resources and per­
sons. The term'content is not used. Content' is rejected 
as a term because of its static, solid connotations. A 
brief illustration of the way the word 'content"tends to 
direct curriculum thinking is useful at this point. Mauritz 
Johnson has written in a paper on curriculum theory, "The 
only necessary, albeit insufficient, criterion for cur­
riculum selection is that the content be teachable .... 
Cultural content is learnable if meaning can be perceived 
in it. Cultural content has meaning for an individual to 
the extent that he recognizes appropriate rules by which his 
actions toward it may be governed " (Johnson, 1967, 137). 
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Such a conception of content is not acceptable for this 
model in which persons themselves are meaning creators. 
"Students" in this process model do not spend their time 
trying to grasp the meanings of others in order to learn 
what rules to passively follow. The goal instead is for 
reflection, critical examination of all cultural content. 
Freire's concept of "students" who "practice co-intentional 
education" (Freire, 1970, 56) with their instructors in a 
Subject to Subject relationship is valuable here. While 
Freire used some ready-made content occasionally with per­
sons learning to read in South America, his essential 
emphasis has been on the "learners" creating their own cur­
riculum, deciding on the words they themselves want to learn. 
Seymour Sarason has discussed the failure of many innovative 
projects in the sixties as being caused in large part by 
the tremendous emphasis that had to be placed on materials, 
on books, on predetermined content. With time and in-
service preparation constraints, very little emphasis came 
to be placed on what teachers and students would create as 
curriculum together. The materials became the curriculum 
(Sarason, 1971), The curriculum theorizer must examine the 
American over-reliance flat visual materials. Hall has 
written 
We are in the grip of McLuhan's Gutenberg Revolu­
tion and extension transference. Truth is printed 
on a page; reality is pictures. All of which 
conditions people to a flat, shallow approach 
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to all sensory inputs. We live in an artificial, 
and for the most part two-dimensional, frag­
mented, manipulative world of advertising and 
propaganda. (Hall, 1976, 155) 
Postman has pondered 
the powerful biases forced upon us by the Age 
of the Printed Word. . . . Print is not dead, 
it's just old—and old technologies do not gen­
erate new patterns of behavior. For us print 
is the technology of convention. We have ac­
comodated our sense to it. We have routinized 
and even ritualized our responses to it. We 
have devoted our institutions, which are now 
venerable, to its service. By maintaining the 
printed word as the keystone of education, we 
are therefore opting for political and social 
stasis. (Postman, 1972, 56-57) 
Kuhn and others have criticized textbooks and their typical 
approaches to topics as containing ready-made, permanent 
truths. Kuhn observes, regarding the influence of text­
books on what is perceived as truth in science by students, 
"More than any other single aspect of science, that peda­
gogical form has determined our image of the nature of 
science and of the role of discovery and invention in its 
advance " (Kuhn, 1962, 148), Eric Broudy has recently done 
a study on the conservatism of textbook publishers and text­
book content (Broudy, 1975), Huebner notes that reliance 
on the textbook as the organizing focus of the curriculum 
goes back nearly one-hundred years to William T. Harris. 
Huebner says that Harris established "the basic paradigm of 
the curriculum field which prevails today with minor themes 
and variations. Perhaps even more important is his impact 
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on the organization of the schools and his concern for text­
books as the center of the curriculum, rather than the teach­
er as the center " (Huebner, 1977, 92-93). 
The curriculum theorizer, having difficulty seeing the 
curriculum and the "student" in process together, evolving 
together, would do well to recall that the English language 
conditions its speakers to think in terms of substantives. 
Marsh notes, "We like to have nouns connected with verbs— 
things or essences connected with movements or processes— 
ignoring the fact that the thing and the process are in­
separable.' Marsh gives an example: "We say, 'The dancer 
danced.' But this ignores the fact that the dancing ij3 
the dancer and the dancer ijs the dancing. If there's no 
dancing, there's no dancer " (Marsh, 1969, 107). In a 
similar way of reflecting, the curriculum theorizer would do 
well occasionally to question the sharp split between the 
"learner" and "curriculum" as isolated and distinct entities. 
Can there be a "learner" without a "curriculum"? Can there 
be a "curriculum" without a "learner"? 
In this model curriculum is not a "given," transmitted 
from "teacher" to "learner." Instead curriculum is con­
ceptualized in terms similar to Florence Stratemeyer's 
"Persistent Life Situations." The "learner" is actively pur­
suing knowledge important to him. The "certified learner" 
is also learning. In Stratemeyer's scheme the curriculum 
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develops through "students'" explicit and implicit concerns, 
through questions which arise in the course of on-going 
activities, through joint planning, through data analysis 
and through group and community concerns (Stratemeyer, 
1947, 301-311), Choice of curricula to be investigated is 
determined by questioning the meaning the curriculum ex­
perience will have for "students." What insights, questions 
do they bring individually and collectively to the proposed 
curriculum experience? Will logical explanations and more 
knowledge help the "students" in this matter? Is interest 
in the proposed curriculum experience transitory or lasting? 
Will the proposed curriculum experience help "students" and 
"certified learners" in their ability to deal with their 
evolving realities? Will the proposed curriculum experience 
be best pursued collectively or individually, incidentally 
or directly? Can ways of working be utilized which are sug­
gested by the problem itself and not by any pre-ordained 
content or materials? Can one curriculum experience lead 
naturally into another? Will skills be developed in use 
through situations in which the "students" themselves see 
a real need for them? Will the principles underlying the 
skills become increasingly apparent? Will "students" "get 
into" the curriculum experience in a vital, self-enhancing 
way? (Stratemeyer, 1947, 311-350). 
In such an approach to curriculum, emphasis on the 
"students" experience now, in the present moment, becomes 
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important. Whitehead's call for "an understanding of an 
insistent present" is appropriate here*. 
The only use of a knowledge of the past is to 
equip us for the present. No more deadly harm 
can be done to young mind than by depreciation 
of the present. The present contains all that 
there is. It is holy ground, for it is the past, 
and it is the future. ... Do not be deceived by 
the pedantry of dates. The ages of 
Shakespeare and of Moliere are no less past 
than are the ages of Sophocles and of Virgil. 
(Whitehead, 1967, 3) 
Dorothy Lee's discussion of experiences and activi­
ties among some peoples she has studied as an anthropolo­
gist can be helpful to the curriculum theorizer who is con­
cerned about the quality of the "students'" experience. 
Lee talks about the Tikopia and notes, "Here I found work 
whose motivation lay in the situation itself, a situation 
which included the worker and his society, the activity and 
its end, and whose satisfaction lay in social value " (Lee, 
1959, 29). She discusses also the Hopi way of life. "There 
is satisfaction in the situation itself. . . . Value is 
total and is to be found in a total situation " (Lee, 1959, 
73), Lee observes * 
Our impulse is to break up the situation because 
we are culturally trained to comprehend a totality 
only after we break it up into familiar phrasings. 
But in this way we miss the value inherent in it, 
since it disappears with analysis, and cannot 
be recreated synthetically afterwards. Having 
created a series of elements, we then find no 
difficulty in motivating them according to a 
series of needs. (Lee, 1959, 74) 
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Beverly Galyean in a book on confluent, Gestalt edu­
cation provides a list of questions and concerns which are 
helpful when the "certified learner" is trying to see if 
the "learner" is able to put himself or herself into the 
on-going curricular experience in a meaningful way. The 
interaction proceeds from beginning such as these: 
What's going on now? 
How are you feeling now? 
What are you doing? 
How do you do that? 
Are you saying that? Or is someone else speaking? 
What do you want to do? 
What are the consequences of that choice? 
Are you willing to take the risks? 
How do you help yourself? 
Only you know. 
You can resolve it. 
I will not do it for you, because 
You are your own expert. 
You are responsible. (Galyean, 1975, 218) 
Interaction in the Model 
In this model fluid interactions in a multiplicity of 
settings, social contexts, and educational environments are 
stressed. The learning experience as lived in by the 
"learners" and the "certified learner" is paramount with 
space and time limitations less rigid than typical curricu­
lum thinking which tends to operate in terms of specific, 
identical daily blocks of time and the physical school 
building. However, the learning experience as lived in by 
the "learners" and the "certified learner" is acknowledged 
as a political environment. Apple enjoins curriculum theor­
ists to bear in mind that schools are overtly insulated from 
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political forces but are covertly teaching a "middle-class" 
and often schizophrenic value system " (Apple, 1975c, 96), 
Dewey's question of how students can be prepared for life 
in a democracy if they do not experience a democratic school 
environment remains unanswered. Persons such as Brubaker 
and Nelson have suggested that schools are bureaucratic 
and professional institutions (Brubaker & Nelson, 1972), 
The reconstructionist curriculum theorists have been ad­
dressing the question of the assumed democracy of American 
institutions for some time.* Persons in authentic "learner" 
to "certified learner" relationships can take a critical 
look at their daily lived-in experience together and re­
create, re-design the lived-in experience as needed. They 
are then better able to critically examine the political 
world beyond the school. An all too common problem is that 
teachers themselves must operate in settings in which they 
themselves are "object" to the administrators as "Subject." 
Sarason's example of the new math being taught to teachers 
in the old ways leading teachers to then teach the new math 
in the old way is appropriate here (Sarason, 1971, 42-48). 
Helpful also is Sergiovanni's tracing of Frederick W. Taylor's 
influence on education through his principles of scientific 
management. Also, Sergeovanni writes about the human 
*See for example many selections in Pinar (1975) and also 
in Macdonald and Zaret (1975). 
78 
relations model of persons in organizations as seeing or­
ganizations and persons in inevitable conflict. He comments 
on the combining of neo-scientific management principles 
and human relations principles in educational settings. 
"The movement has provided renewed legitimacy and reinforce­
ment to work standardization, centralization, task spec­
ialization and formalization not only in educational pro­
gram format but in classrooms and organizational patterns " 
(Sergiovanni, 1976, 19), One of the important principles 
has led to less teacher self-supervision. The task is to 
"divide the work of managers and workers so that managers 
assume responsibility for planning and preparing work and 
for supervising " (Sergiovanni, 1976, 7). Franklin Bobbiti 
was one of the first to apply scientific management ideas to 
education, "Directors and supervisors must keep the workers 
supplied with detailed instructions as to the work to be 
done, the standards to be reached, the methods to be em­
ployed, and the materials and appliances to be used. . . . 
Whatever the nature or purpose of the organization, if it is 
an effective one, these are always the directive and super­
visory tasks " (Sergiovanni, 1976, 7), Wilson, Shapiro, 
et. al. (1969) have traced the gradual lessening of the 
teacher's control over her own teaching as concepts of super­
vision evolved. Larger schools, local orientations and out­
looks, a "make do" attitude from the Depression led to 
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supervision as a remedial and provincial function. Super­
visors have come to stereotype teachers in faulty and 
negative ways. Wilson, Shapiro, et. al. have deplored the 
kind of relationship between teachers and supervisors which 
reminds one of McGregor's theory X views of persons in 
classical management theory. Sergiovanni points out that 
although theory X negative views of human nature may not 
now always apply to the administrator-teacher relationship, 
"This conception remains ubiquitous as applied to students " 
(Sergiovanni, 1976, 10). 
An important, essential goal in this model is that of 
"certified learners" having more control over their profes­
sional lives with "learners" doing the same. Sergiovanni's 
human resources model assumptions with regard to desired 
interactions are significant here. "Superordinates work to 
continually expand the areas over which subordinates exer­
cise self-direction and self-control as they develop and 
demonstrate greater insight and ability and expectations " 
(Sergiovanni, 1976, 15). This model assumes that "certified 
learners" and "learners" will exercise responsible self-
direction and self-supervision in the accomplishment of tasks 
meaningful to them. 
What are some major considerations in the facilitation 
of authentic "learner" to "certified learner" relationships? 
Sarason's emphasis on the creation of new settings is 
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valuable. He reminds the curriculum theorist that domain 
assumptions, or as he calls them "categories of thought," 
must be faced, identified and challenged if one is really 
going to create something new (Sarason, 1972, xii)^ He 
suggests that change in a society can be measured by the 
number of new settings created but continually cautions 
that those attempting to create new settings must critically 
examine behavioral and programmatic regularities which 
have been operating in the old settings and which might be 
automatically applied in new settings, crippling them 
(Sarason, 1972, 3). The settings are important^ for Sarason 
cautions that characteristics of individuals are always, 
to some extent a reflection of the setting in which those 
characteristics are manifested (Sarason, 1972, 11-12), 
Going back to an emphasis on developing the curriculum with 
learners, the curriculum theorist can see that in looking 
for significant topics for learners to pursue with their 
teachers, Stratemeyer stresses that one of the first things 
which must be done is for the persons who will be using a 
particular environment to examine it and design it to fit 
their purposes (Stratemeyer, 1947, 346), 
Interactions themselves in this model are created be­
tween and among persons. They are not all initiated, dom­
inated by the "certified learner" although they are directed 
by the "certified learner." Dewey gives an illustration of 
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the difference between merely exciting or indulging a 
"learner's" interest and effectively directing that interestl 
. . . All children like to express themselves 
through the medium of form and color. If you 
simply indulge this interest by letting the child 
go on indefinitely, there is no growth that is 
more than accidental. But let the child first 
express his impulse, and then through criticism, 
question, and suggestion bring him to conscious­
ness of what he has done, and what he needs to 
do, and the result is quite different. . . . 
You see the conventional tree of childhood— 
a vertical line with horizontal branches on each 
side. If the child had been allowed to go on 
repeating this sort of thing day by day, he would 
be indulging his instinct rather than exercising 
it. But the child was now asked to look closely 
at trees, to compare those seen with the one 
drawn, to examine more closely and consciously 
into the conditions of his work. Then he drew 
trees from observation. 
Finally he drew again from combined obser­
vation, memory, and imagination. He made again 
a free illustration, expressing his own imagina­
tive thought, but controlled by detailed study of 
actual trees. (Dewey, 1915, 41-2) 
Interactions in this model promote the free choosing of 
an activity, the evolving of an educational experience for 
its own sake. Clear cut distinctions between work and play 
are not desired. Dewey has written^ 
Activity carried on under conditions of external 
pressure or coercion is not carried on for any 
significance attached to the doing. The course 
of action is not intrinsically satisfying; it is 
a mere means for avoiding some penalty, or for 
gaining some reward at its conclusion. . . . 
But the end should be intrinsic to the action; 
it should be its end--a part of its own course. 
(Dewey, 1944, 204) 
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In a provocative paper entitled "Sociopolitical Analysis 
and Curriculum Theory," Michael Apple and Nancy King discuss 
the work - play dichotomy and kindergarten children. By 
October, children who a month earlier had not equated the 
word "work" with the notion of what it is children do in 
kindergarten, had come to do so (Apple & King, 1977, 122), 
They had also come to see early during the school year that 
work activities were determined by the teacher and were more 
important than play activities. 
The plucky first grade heroine of Ramona, a recent 
novel for children about a "liberated" family, finds no 
liberation in school'. 
She sat quietly as Mrs. Griggs pushed a lock of 
hair behind her ear and said, as she had said 
every day since first grade had started, "We are 
not in kindergarten any longer. We are in the 
first grade, and people in the first grade must 
learn to be good workers." (Cleary, 1975, 78) 
After many unpleasant days at school, with incessant warnings 
not to waste paste and not to help others, the heroine 
falters! 
Ramona dreaded school because she felt Mrs. Griggs 
did not like her, and she did not enjoy spending 
the whole day in a room with someone who did not 
like her, especially when that person was in 
charge. (Cleary, 1975, 122) 
How many endless days are spent by persons in school with 
other persons who do not seem to like them, performing tasks 
which have no meaning to any of the participants? 
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Summary 
This conceptual model has been created through explora­
tion of a philosophy grounded in process orientations drawn 
from the fields of curriculum theory, general semantics, com­
munication theory, and anthropology. The necessity for 
curriculum theorists to question the taken-for-granted, 
unexamined assumptions underlying the school experience has 
been shown. Language influences on the curriculum theorist's 
work have been briefly identified also. The model creator 
has developed her model through examination of the three es­
sential foci of all philosophic questions. These foci are 
axiological (concerned with the nature of human value systems); 
ontological (concerned with the human nature of being); and 
epistemological (concerned with the nature of human knowledge). 
The model has been constructed on these assumptions: all 
curriculum statements are value statements; all "teachers" 
and "students" are continually in process; and human know­
ledge is best understood in terms of the knowner (for example, 
the "student") rather than in terms of something-to-be-known 
(for example, the content). To illustrate relationships 
among persons as present in the model, interactions have been 
discussed with quotation marks used to indicate that the 
terms "certified learner," (teacher), and "learner" or 
"student" are high level abstractions and over-simplifications 
of complex persons-in-process. Mindful that no one model is 
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suited to all learning situations or to all instructors or 
to all students, the investigator presents her own experience 
with the model in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL 
This chapter will re-ernphasize this model creator's 
orientations and discuss an attempt to utilize the model in 
college teaching. Also the chapter will briefly discuss cur­
riculum theory as a field of study and possible research 
directions in curriculum theory as implied by this model. 
The sub-headings in the chapter therefore are Recapitulation: 
The Investigator's Perspective in Model Creation, The Model 
as Now Experienced, and Curriculum Theory as a Field of 
Study and Research Potentials. 
Recapitulation: The Investigator's 
Perspective in Model Creation 
Tyler and Herrick in their classic work on curriculum 
theory have proposed that the curriculum theorist must di­
rect attention toward all the components involved in the 
development of an educational program in order to identify 
problems and resolve them. They caution that care must be 
taken so "the curriculum worker is not working as one of 
th e blind men examining the elephant " (Tyler & Herrick, 
1950, 1), But Wendell Johnson reminds the curriculum theorist ; 
Due reflection must surely leave one with the con­
viction, however, that there is a gravely mis­
leading detail in this story. . . and a correspond­
ing flaw in the theory of human disagreement 
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which the story represents. The misleading 
detail is that the investigators are described 
as blind. 
As a consequence, millions of children 
have been insidiously affected by the implica­
tion that if only these six legendary companions 
in research had been able to see reasonably well 
they would have agreed perfectly. 
No redder herring, surely, has ever been 
dragged across the faint, faint trail of truth. 
(Kurman, 1978, 266-7) 
Paula Kurman has quoted Johnson and enlarged I 
Going a step further, one might ask, what's 
wrong with having six perspectives? Or seven? 
Or a hundred? Since man has learned to fly, why 
not an aerial perspective of the nature of the 
elephant? The conclusions will be different 
not because the others are in error, but because 
the level of entry to the problem will have 
changed. (Kurman, 1978, 267) 
Kurman concludes with comments about implications for re­
search activities similar to those of David Smith discussed 
in Chapter I. Kurman stresses the inevitability of bias, 
the importance of context regarding the investigator, the 
necessity to allow for differing conclusions and the need 
for alternative perspectives (Kurman, 1978, 267). The 
biases of this investigator have been acknowledged as the 
essential philosophic grounding of her model. In this 
chapter there will be a focus on the playing out of the 
model's philosophic grounding in the context of an evolv­
ing undergraduate college education course. This is done 
mindful of the dissertation's emphasis on the need to ap­
preciate varying perspectives and the need to avoid propos­
ing any one model as a model for all. 
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The investigator has determined the following assump­
tions discussed in Chapter III to be the philosophic 
grounding of her model. First, to be interested in cur­
riculum theory is to be concerned about the lived-in 
experience of persons in school settings, without having to 
make short term, ameliorative pronouncements about same. 
Second, to be interested in curriculum theory is to be con­
cerned above all else about persons as unique and valued 
individuals. Third, all curriculum statements are value 
laden. In working through the model creation task implied 
by these assumptions, the investigator has followed a pro­
cedure which has been deliberate, subjective, intellectually 
playful and based on human interests and concerns. She has 
endeavored to create a just model to serve as a disclosure 
model for curriculum theorizing. The intent of the in­
vestigator regarding the successful implementation of her 
model accords with Stake's concept of "successive approxi­
mations" such that "major attention is given to getting an 
enterprise in operation, even though the initial runs are 
crude and faulty, so that corrections can be based on ex­
perience " (Stake, 1969, 29), Stake concludes, "In our 
present state the derivation of the specific from the gen­
eral is some sort of intuitive magic. . . . We need to 
understand it, to stimulate it, not necessarily replace it 
(Stake, 1969, 30), Macdonald has written concerning the 
generating of propositions to guide the creator of 
88 
theoretical models, "This task is a dual technical-logical 
and aesthetic (intuitive) process " (Macdonald, 1978, 9), 
The essence of the effort in this dissertation has been 
model creation and the model itself has been created through 
its philosophic orientation being explicitly thought-out. 
This approach is analogous to the phenomenological pro­
cedure described by Howard Becker, ert. aJ . in their study 
Boys in White." 
These assumptions committed us to working with 
an open theoretical scheme in which variables 
were to be discovered., rather than with a scheme 
in which variables decided on in advance would 
be located and their consequences isolated and 
measured. (Bruyn, 1966, 273) 
The Model as Now Experienced 
Dissatisfied with the static nature of her college 
teaching efforts and slowly "taken" by her model as it has 
evolved, the investigator has begun attempting to move 
toward a process orientation in her teaching. Consistent 
with the philosophic grounding of her model, she has con­
sciously determined that she is concerned about the lived-
in school experience of the persons in her college classes, 
that she is concerned about the students as persons and that 
she acknowledges an existential, process philosophy as the 
guiding and sustaining impetus for her efforts. She has 
consciously rejected the notion that one person in the 
class is always the "teacher" and al1 the other persons in 
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the class are always the "learners." She prefers to operate 
in terms of persons learning together, creating the cur­
riculum together. 
In her first effort toward curriculum in process, the 
investigator pre-determined topics to be studied in the 
course of the term, allowing students to choose from a list 
of possibilities (individual projects) to complete the work 
on each topic. Possibilities included options such as 
design of learning centers, case studies, evaluation of 
Curriculum Library materials, panel discussions, micro-
teaching, interviews, etc. Completion of six possibilities 
was required for an A, four for a B and three for a C. 
Multiple choice tests were used to evaluate mastery of topic 
content. This was done during both semesters in 1976. 
In the fall of 1977, the investigator drew up a list of pos­
sible course topics for the class to choose among. The 
choosing was done on the first day of class and the in­
structor then drew up the topics for study based on the 
"student" choices. Again, a list of possibilities (indi­
vidual projects) was included with several options for each 
topic. "Students" were encouraged to share the results of 
their work on possibilities with other class members. 
Class attendance was not required but "students" were told 
that anything discussed in class by the instructor or by 
other "students," for example in panel discussions, was 
subject to be included on the take-home tests. The 
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investigator surveyed the class members anonymously to 
determine their attitudes toward the class and to consider 
changes for the next semester.* The class had 23 "stu­
dents;" 78.2 percent of the "students" said they liked the 
class. While 43.4 percent of the "students" said the 
amount of time devoted to the course as compared to other 
classes was about the same, 39.1 percent of the "students" 
said they were putting more time into this class as com­
pared to others. Responding to a question about the pos­
sibilities, 39.1 percent saw them as busy work, 21.7 per­
cent saw them as assignments like any others and 60.8 per­
cent saw them as something "students" could get into. 
Some "students" added to the latter, "if we had the time." 
Also 17.3 percent said the instructor should require at­
tendance; 47.8 percent said A and B grades should be more 
directly tied into class participation and presentation and 
60.8 percent said that as much as a week or two weeks time 
should be taken in determining class priorities for course 
topics. Finally, 26 percent suggested that the class be 
offered at a time later than 8:00 A.M. 
In spring semester of 1978 class time was moved to 
10:00 A.M. Attendance was required and "students" took two 
weeks to determine course topics. The instructor did not 
^Responses from the "students" on the surveys from the 1977 
and 1978 classes are available fro:n the investigator. Some 
of the percentages are more or less than 100 percent be­
cause of multiple responses or no response by an individual 
on a given question. 
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provide a list from which "students" were to choose. She 
did help them to consolidate their lists and did assign 
each topic to a time space in the semester. She provided a 
list of nineteen options from which "students" could get 
ideas for designing their own possibilities to apply to 
topics and "students" were encouraged to work together if 
they chose. "Students" working for an A were again asked 
to complete six possibilities presenting three of them to 
the class. B requirements were for four possibilities 
with three shared with the class. C requirements called 
for three possibilities. Discussion take-home tests were 
again used. An anonymous survey of the twenty one 
"students" in the class included these responses: 85.7 
percent said they liked the course; 42.8 percent said the 
class was getting as much effort as their other classes; 
47.6 percent said they devoted more time to the class as 
compared to other classes. Also, 9.5 percent of the 
"students" perceived the possibilities as busy work; 9.5 
percent saw them as assignments like any others and 76.1 
percent saw them as something "students" could get into. 
The instructor asked these "students" in the spring 
1978 class to react anonymously to questions borrowed from 
McQus.il's analysis of models in communication to evaluate 
their education course experience. The questions (as 
mentioned in Chapter I) were stated as worded by McQuail 
with one exception. Question four v/as re-written for the 
sake of clarity in this manner! Is the process to be seen 
from the perspective of the sender (teacher) or the (re­
ceivers) students? Seventeen "students" were present the 
day the McQuail questions were given to the class. Here is 
a summary of the questions and the responsesf "Is the 
process one-directional or interactional?" The "students" 
responded by 64.7 percent that the process was interactional; 
29.4 percent stated that it was both interactional and one-
directional. One person responded that the process was one-
directional. "Students" made comments such as this' "The 
processes in this class are interactional. The interaction 
is sometimes slow to start or a little stilted. This is 
because we were taught to be this way (one-directional) and 
it is very hard to outgrow it." Another "student" stated, 
"We can interact with each other and comment freely. The 
procedures branch out and don't confine themselves." The 
next question was, "Is the process open or closed?" This 
brought a response of 88.2 percent that the process was 
open; 11.7 percent of the "students" replied that the 
process was both open and closed. One "student" wrote, 
"To a certain extent, the processes are closed. We are 
expected to do so many projects for a certain grade, the 
book reports must be written according to a little form and 
be a certain number of pages long, and attendance is taken 
into consideration. It is open in that we have freedom to 
work on projects of our own choice and in our own direction." 
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Another "student" wrote, "The process is open because we all 
have a chance to express ourselves and we can change the 
curriculum." The third question asked, "Are meanings fixed 
or 'transacted?'" Replies showed 70.5 percent of the "students" 
said that the class meanings were transacted and 23.5 per­
cent said that the meanings were both fixed and transacted. 
One person said that the meanings were fixed. "Students'" 
comments included the following remarks* "One person's view 
isn't always right. We all discuss together and the meaning— 
as different people perceive it—is brought out. From this 
we all come to learn the meaning—our way!" Another "stu­
dent" wrote, "The course meanings are transacted for the 
class input can alter meanings. Also the meanings come from 
us; they can't be fixed." A "student" who had indicated that 
course meanings were fixed explained} "Our goals are 
fixed—must do six projects and five tests. But they have 
to be or else no one would do anything and we wouldn't 
learn." The fourth question was, "Is the process to be seen 
from the perspective of the sender (teacher) or the receiver 
(students)?" None of the "students" used the terrrs sender and 
receivers in their reply. All wrote in terms of teacher 
and students. While 52.9 percent of the "students" indicated 
that the class process was to be seen from the perspective 
of the "students," 41.1 percent said the process was to be 
seen from the perspective of both the instructor and the 
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students. One person said the process was to be seen from 
the perspective of the teacher. "Student" comments included, 
"The course is constructed from the perspective of both the 
instructor and students since we are all allowed to share 
4 f  ' t  
what we think. One student explained why the terms sender 
1* * 1  
and receivers were not applicable. "In this class I don't 
think the instructor can be labeled as the sender nor can 
the students be labeled as the receivers. Because the 
students and the instructor are both sender and receiver at 
one time or another." The fifth question asked of the pro­
cess, "Is it purposive or non-purposive?" Whereas 17.6 
percent of the "students" said the process in the course was 
non-purposive; 47 percent indicated that purposes evolved 
and 29.4 percent said the course process was purposive. 
Comments included, "The purposes are set in advance, but 
there's not a real feeling of rigidity. We know the topics 
and possibilities, what's expected of us and where we are 
going. But--the way we learn is never the same. Discus­
sions and class "debates" change constantly." Another 
"student" replied, "No, not really. We are supposed to get 
out of the course what we put in it. If you don't do your 
work or read the material you won't get anything. We are 
given all types of resources; we just have to use them right." 
The last question was "Is the process system-linked or 
system-free?" A 70.5 percent total of the "students" re­
plied that it was system-linked, while 23.5 percent responded 
that it was less system-linked than other courses. One 
person answered that it was not system-linked. Comments 
included, "Linked—the course ijs required. You can't get 
by that fact. I wouldn't take it if I didn't have to. But 
I'm glad I'm taking it and I do enjoy it now. But it's 
still linked." One "student" wrote, "The process of this 
class is system-free. (We are required to take this class, 
but this course is ours, not the system's. )" 
The investigator, in using McQuail's questions to 
access her model as well as to guide the further refinement 
of the model as it manifests itself in her teaching exper­
ience, strives for processes which are interactional rather 
than one-directional since this accords with the ontologi-
cal and axiological groundings of her model. McQuail has 
described the interactional process orientation. "Each act 
of communication is a response to a prior one and open to 
modification. The participants are equal and inter­
changeable as communicators and receivers " (McQuail, 1975, 
28), Furthermore, the investigator strives for an open 
process with meanings transacted in keeping with her projec­
tion of interactions in the model as well as her epistem-
ological grounding, especially regarding its emphasis on 
persons as meaning creators. McQuail writes of transacted 
meanings 
There is a relatively high tolerance for variable 
and subjective perception in these situations and 
the receiver of communication is understood to 
96 
be structuring his own social world through his 
reception of communication. (McQuail, 1975, 29) 
Regarding the perspective of the process, the investigator 
desires that it be from the teacher as "certified learner" 
and from the students as "learners" together. This accords 
with her ontological and axiological orientations. McQuail 
has observed^ regarding perspectivesj "To adopt one view 
rather than the other is to give a biased account of the 
communication process " (McQuail, 1975, 29X, Considering 
the question of purposive as contrasted to non-purposive 
processes, the investigator will continually refine her 
model toward a developing, evolving sense of purpose rather 
than toward a pre-determined purpose or complete non-
purpose. The purposes evolve out of the assumptions ground­
ing her model as stated earlier, especially her emphasis on 
the lived-in experience of "students" and her valuing them 
as unique individuals capable of formulating their own goals 
for learning. McQuail reminds his readers, "The same com­
munication process may be purposive for some of its receivers 
and non-purposive for others " (McQuail, 1975, 30)% Robert 
Stake has spoken to the question of goals in a way that has 
meaning for this dissertation in considering the question 
of purpose! 
A truly representative list of educational goals 
will contain competing and even contradictory 
goals. Goals compete with each other. . . . 
Some goals will be contradictory. We seek 
incompatible outcomes. We try to teach faith 
and skepticism. We try to instill deep 
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appreciation, and yet provoke aspiration for some­
thing better. We hope that any one teaching ef­
fort will aid persons with different aims. . . . 
Evaluators should be alert to the fact that 
goals are changing. Our world changes. Our needs 
change. Our values change. Some of our goals 
change even as a function of what happens during 
instruction. . . . We will continue to aspire for 
goals beyond our reach. (Stake, 1969, 36-37) 
Finally, looking at whether the process is system-linked or 
system-free, the investigator asserts that it is system-
linked and that to assume otherwise would be politically 
naive. However, with her emphasis on the importance of 
education as a liberating experience, she acknowledges her 
responsibility to work to influence the system in humane 
directions even as she notes McQuail's caution that "the 
two formulations are irreconcilable " (McQuail, 1975, 31), 
Curriculum Theory as a Field of Study 
and Research Potentials 
Curriculum theory, an emerging field as indicated in 
Chapter III, has not been a primary focus of attention for 
doctoral students in curriculum. A recent study compared 
responses made in 1969 by curriculum practitioners and cur­
riculum professors about important areas to be studied in 
doctoral work with data from curriculum practitioners who 
had earned their doctorates during 1969 - 1975. The new 
curriculum practitioners were asked about which areas of 
study had been most emphasized in their programs. Although 
70 percent of the curriculum professors listed curriculum 
theory as being of great importance and 25 percent listed 
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it as being of moderate importance with only 5 percent list­
ing curriculum theory as relatively unimportant, doctoral 
students in the period from 1969 - 1975 spent little of 
their time on the topic. While 67.3 percent of the prac­
titioners in 1969 had listed curriculum theory as being of 
great importance with 26.9 percent saying it was of moderate 
importance, only 5.8 percent said curriculum theory was 
relatively unimportant. However, only 19.3 percent of the 
practitioners questioned in 1975 who had received their 
degrees since 1969 indicated that curriculum theory had 
received heavy emphasis in their program. Also, only 36.8 
percent said curriculum theory had received moderate empha­
sis in their program. And 43.9 percent indicated that 
curriculum theory had received limited or no emphasis in 
their program. Organization and administration of public 
schools had received heavy emphasis in the doctoral programs 
of 59.6 percent of the 1975 practitioners. Also, 43.9 per­
cent said that supervision of instruction had received 
heavy emphasis (Wood & Wood$ 1978, 395-399), Apparently 
curriculum practitioners are not receiving a strong ground­
ing in curriculum theory. Wood and Woods' work shows 
further that little attention has been given in doctoral 
programs to design of research studies in curriculum and 
instruction with 55.8 percent of the recently graduated 
practitioners responding that the topic received limited or 
no emphasis in their program. Furthermore, 61.4 percent of 
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those practitioners stated that critique of research of 
curriculum and instruction received limited or no emphasis 
in their doctoral studies. (Wood & Woods, 1978, 396) 
What kinds of questions should concern the person doing 
research in curriculum theory? Mann raises these as pos­
sibilities: first; concern with a situation, second; con­
cern with a classroom context, third; concern with identi­
fying optimal conditions for desired situational outcomes 
to emerge, fourth; concern with over-emphasis given to in­
structional objectives and technologies and fifth; concern 
because the phenomena do exist. (Mann, 1968, 211 - 212) 
Brophy, Biddle, and Good (1975) have made a case for moving 
more toward the analysis of what is actually happening in 
an educational situation being researched. They note that 
t t  
research has not tended to observe teachers and students 
in the context of on-going educational experiences. In­
stead they say emphasis has been on such things as curricular 
innovations, teachers' backgrounds and experiences and pro­
grams of teacher preparation. Also they point out that 
curriculum evaluation studies tend to do quick pre-and post-
testing on "students" with little direct classroom obser­
vation and without focus on the individual classroom as a 
unit of study. For example they note, "Like teacher ef­
fectiveness research, the Coleman Report may also be 
faulted because it deals with input and outcome variables 
concerned with schools but not with the processes by which 
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education is accomplished in those schools " (Brophy, 
Biddle and Good, 1975, 23)* Zahorik has shown that teachers' 
main focus in planning for instruction is neither specific 
objectives for "students" to achieve nor activities in which 
"students" should engage but rather content, "the range and 
particulars of the subject matter of the lesson or unit to 
be taught " (Zahorik, 1975, 138), Additional follow-up re­
search with large samples is needed. Nancy King's dis­
sertation emphasis on the daily social experience of a given 
class of kindergarten children is an exemplar of the kinds 
of empirical studies which should be done. Apple and King 
explain', 
To understand the social reality of schooling it 
is necessary to study it in actual classroom 
settings. Each concept, role, and object is a 
social creation bound to the situation in which 
it is produced. The meanings of classroom inter­
action cannot be assumed; they must be dis­
covered. (Apple & King, 1977, 118) 
Such research would be appropriate to evaluate A Process 
Model for Curriculum Theorizing with participant observation 
procedures utilized. Herbert Blumer observes in the intro­
duction to a book on participant observation as a research 
methodologyJ 
The question of how to study human conduct and 
group life goes far beyond a problem of how to 
apply an established body of tested knowledge 
of scientific procedure. . . . The concept sig­
nifies the relation which the human observer of 
human beings cannot escape—having to participate 
in some fashion in the experience and action of 
those he observes. (Bruyn, 1966, v - vi) 
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Bruyn explains that the method of participant observation 
implies a philosophic grounding on the part of the in­
vestigator! 
The researcher can no longer shrug off phil­
osophical problems as 'unrelated' to his work 
in collecting human data. He must now resolve 
these contradictions by developing a syste­
matic viewpoint of the phenomenon of man. 
(Bruyn, 1966, xvi) 
Bruyn's axioms and their corollaries are compatible 
investigator's conception of how her model could be 
amined in an actual school setting over a period of 
The axioms and corollaries are as follows: 
Axiom 1: The participant observer shares in the 
life activities and sentiments of people in face-
to-face relationships. Corollary: The role of 
the participant observer requires both detachment 
and personal involvement. 
Axiom 2: The participant observer is a normal 
part of the culture and the life of the people 
under observation. Corollary: The scientific 
role of the participant observer is interde­
pendent with his social role in the culture of 
the observed. 
Axiom 3: The role of the participant observer 
reflects the social process of living in 
society. (Bruyn, 1966, 13-22) 
Bruyn summarizes l 
Unlike the traditional empiricist, the partici­
pant observer must view a culture just as the 
people he is studying view it, including re­
flecting on the social process in which he is 
inwardly engaged. This means he sees goals and 
interests of people in the same way that the 
people see them, not as functions or experimental 
causes as would the traditional empiricist'; it 
means that he sees'people in the concrete 
reality in which they present themselves in 
daily experiences, not as abstractions as would 
with the 
ex-
time . 
the traditional empiricist; it means he senses 
that these people act freely within the scope of 
what they see as possible, not as determined 
agents of social forces as the traditional empiri­
cist would see them. (Bruyn, 1966, 22) 
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